Evelyn Goh
Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961 1974
From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally'
Evelyn Goh
Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961 1974
From 'Red Menace' to 'Tacit Ally'
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This book is about US policy towards China from 1961 to 1974.
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Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 316
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Dezember 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 515g
- ISBN-13: 9780521108621
- ISBN-10: 0521108624
- Artikelnr.: 26010602
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 316
- Erscheinungstermin: 31. Dezember 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 515g
- ISBN-13: 9780521108621
- ISBN-10: 0521108624
- Artikelnr.: 26010602
Evelyn Goh is the Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, where she is also the Director of the Southeast Asia Institute.
Part I. Competing Discourses, 1961-8: 1. 'Red menance' to 'revolutionary
rival': re-casting the Chinese communist threat; 2. 'Troubled modernizer'
but 'resurgent power': revisionist images of the PRC and arguments for a
new China policy; 3. The revisionist legacy: the discourse of
reconciliation with China by 1968; Part II. Discursive Transitions,
1969-71: 4. Nixon's public China policy discourse in context; 5. Debating
the rapprochement: 'resurgent revolutionary power' vs. 'threatened realist
power'; Part III. Discourses of Rapprochement in Practice, 1971-4: 6.
'Principled realist power': laying the discursive foundations of a new
relationship, July 1971 to February 1972; 7. Principles in practice: policy
implications of the decision for rapprochement; 8. 'Selling' the
relationship: the Nixon Administration's justification of the New China
policy; 9. 'Tacit ally' June 1972 to 1974: consolidating or saving the
US-China rapprochement.
rival': re-casting the Chinese communist threat; 2. 'Troubled modernizer'
but 'resurgent power': revisionist images of the PRC and arguments for a
new China policy; 3. The revisionist legacy: the discourse of
reconciliation with China by 1968; Part II. Discursive Transitions,
1969-71: 4. Nixon's public China policy discourse in context; 5. Debating
the rapprochement: 'resurgent revolutionary power' vs. 'threatened realist
power'; Part III. Discourses of Rapprochement in Practice, 1971-4: 6.
'Principled realist power': laying the discursive foundations of a new
relationship, July 1971 to February 1972; 7. Principles in practice: policy
implications of the decision for rapprochement; 8. 'Selling' the
relationship: the Nixon Administration's justification of the New China
policy; 9. 'Tacit ally' June 1972 to 1974: consolidating or saving the
US-China rapprochement.
Part I. Competing Discourses, 1961-8: 1. 'Red menance' to 'revolutionary
rival': re-casting the Chinese communist threat; 2. 'Troubled modernizer'
but 'resurgent power': revisionist images of the PRC and arguments for a
new China policy; 3. The revisionist legacy: the discourse of
reconciliation with China by 1968; Part II. Discursive Transitions,
1969-71: 4. Nixon's public China policy discourse in context; 5. Debating
the rapprochement: 'resurgent revolutionary power' vs. 'threatened realist
power'; Part III. Discourses of Rapprochement in Practice, 1971-4: 6.
'Principled realist power': laying the discursive foundations of a new
relationship, July 1971 to February 1972; 7. Principles in practice: policy
implications of the decision for rapprochement; 8. 'Selling' the
relationship: the Nixon Administration's justification of the New China
policy; 9. 'Tacit ally' June 1972 to 1974: consolidating or saving the
US-China rapprochement.
rival': re-casting the Chinese communist threat; 2. 'Troubled modernizer'
but 'resurgent power': revisionist images of the PRC and arguments for a
new China policy; 3. The revisionist legacy: the discourse of
reconciliation with China by 1968; Part II. Discursive Transitions,
1969-71: 4. Nixon's public China policy discourse in context; 5. Debating
the rapprochement: 'resurgent revolutionary power' vs. 'threatened realist
power'; Part III. Discourses of Rapprochement in Practice, 1971-4: 6.
'Principled realist power': laying the discursive foundations of a new
relationship, July 1971 to February 1972; 7. Principles in practice: policy
implications of the decision for rapprochement; 8. 'Selling' the
relationship: the Nixon Administration's justification of the New China
policy; 9. 'Tacit ally' June 1972 to 1974: consolidating or saving the
US-China rapprochement.