Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Ten pairs of specially written essays present substantially opposed perspectives on topics including narrow content, externalism and privileged access, normativity, mental causation, consciousness, qualia and emergentism. Taken together, the essays provide an engaging and dynamic presentation of the contemporary contours of philosophy of mind, ideal for undergraduate and graduate course use.
Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Ten pairs of specially written essays present substantially opposed perspectives on topics including narrow content, externalism and privileged access, normativity, mental causation, consciousness, qualia and emergentism. Taken together, the essays provide an engaging and dynamic presentation of the contemporary contours of philosophy of mind, ideal for undergraduate and graduate course use.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Brian P. McLaughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.
Inhaltsangabe
Notes on Contributors ix Introduction Jonathan Cohen xii PART I MENTAL CONTENT 1 Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3 1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5 2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 20 Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35 3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 37 4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 53 Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67 5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 69 6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 85 Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103 7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 105 8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard G. Heck Jr 117 PART II PHYSICALISM 139 Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141 9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism Louise Antony 143 10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 160 Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183 11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 185 12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 200 Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225 13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 227 14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 243 PART III THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE 265 Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267 15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 269 16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 287 Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301 17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 303 18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 319 Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333 19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 335 20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 358 Index 377
Notes on Contributors ix Introduction Jonathan Cohen xii PART I MENTAL CONTENT 1 Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content? 3 1 Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions Gabriel Segal 5 2 There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content Sarah Sawyer 20 Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access? 35 3 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent Anthony Brueckner 37 4 Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent Michael McKinsey 53 Is the Intentional Essentially Normative? 67 5 Resisting Normativism in Psychology Georges Rey 69 6 Normativism Defended Ralph Wedgwood 85 Is There Non-Conceptual Content? 103 7 The Revenge of the Given Jerry Fodor 105 8 Are There Different Kinds of Content? Richard G. Heck Jr 117 PART II PHYSICALISM 139 Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable? 141 9 Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism Louise Antony 143 10 The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism Paul M. Churchland 160 Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists? 183 11 A Priori Physicalism Frank Jackson 185 12 On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism Brian P. McLaughlin 200 Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation? 225 13 Causation and Mental Causation Jaegwon Kim 227 14 Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough Barry Loewer 243 PART III THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN NATURE 265 Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical? 267 15 Dualist Emergentism Martine Nida-Rümelin 269 16 Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness David Braddon-Mitchell 287 Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical? 301 17 New Troubles for the Qualia Freak Michael Tye 303 18 A Case for Qualia Sydney Shoemaker 319 Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness? 333 19 All Consciousness Is Perceptual Jesse Prinz 335 20 Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I) Christopher Peacocke 358 Index 377
Rezensionen
"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentiousissues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape andidentifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that isthoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone withan interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind."(Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)
"This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy ofmind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide anexcellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness,intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of thechapters make important contributions to the subject in their ownright." David Chalmers, Australian National University
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