McLaughlin

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

Herausgeber: McLaughlin, Brian P; Cohen, Jonathan

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Ten pairs of specially written essays present substantially opposed perspectives on topics including narrow content, externalism and privileged access, normativity, mental causation, consciousness, qualia and emergentism. Taken together, the essays provide an engaging and dynamic presentation of the contemporary contours of philosophy of mind, ideal for undergraduate and graduate course use.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley
• Seitenzahl: 416
• Erscheinungstermin: 1. Oktober 2007
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 246mm x 173mm x 25mm
• Gewicht: 839g
• ISBN-13: 9781405117609
• ISBN-10: 1405117605
• Artikelnr.: 21634074

Autorenporträt

Brian P. McLaughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.

Inhaltsangabe

Notes on Contributors.

Introduction: Jonathan Cohen (University of California, SanDiego).

Part I: Mental Content:.

Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?.

1. Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributions:Gabriel Segal (King's College, London).

2. There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content: Sarah Sawyer(University of Nebraska-Lincoln).

Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with PrivilegedAccess?.

3. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent: AnthonyBrueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara).

4. Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistent: MichaelMcKinsey (Wayne State University).

Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?.

5. Normativism Defended: Ralph Wedgwood (University ofOxford).

6. Resisting Normativism in Psychology: Georges Rey (Universityof Maryland at College Park).

Is There Non-Conceptual Content?.

7. The Revenge of the Given: Jerry Fodor (RutgersUniversity).

8. Are There Different Kinds of Content?: Richard G. Heck Jr(Brown University).

Part II: Physicalism:.

Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?.

9. Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialism:Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst).

10. The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism: Paul M.Churchland (University of California, San Diego).

Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?.

11. A Priori Physicalism: Frank Jackson (Australian NationalUniversity).

12. On the Limits of A Priori Physicalism: Brian P. McLaughlin(Rutgers University).

Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?.

13. Causation and Mental Causation: Jaegwon Kim (BrownUniversity).

14. Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough: Barry Loewer(Rutgers University).

Part III: The Place of Consciousness in Nature:.

Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?.

15. Dualist Emergentism: Martine Nida-Rümelin (Universityof Fribourg, Switzerland).

16. Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousness: DavidBraddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney).

Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents ofExperiences Identical?.

17. New Troubles for the Qualia Freak: Michael Tye (Universityof Texas at Austin).

18. A Case for Qualia: Sydney Shoemaker (CornellUniversity).

Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of PerceptualConsciousness?.

19. All Consciousness Is Perceptual: Jesse Prinz (University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill).

20. Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I): Christopher Peacocke(Columbia University).

Index

Rezensionen

"The volume succeeds in crystallizing many of the contentiousissues in the field, whilst developing the conceptual landscape andidentifying new issues. This is a compelling publication that isthoughtfully constructed and is essential reading for anyone withan interest in the contemporary debates in philosophy of mind."(Philosophical Psychology, 14 December 2011)

"This book gives the reader a vivid sense of the philosophy ofmind as a living activity. The chapters of this book provide anexcellent introduction to ongoing debates about consciousness,intentionality, and physicalism. At the same time, many of thechapters make important contributions to the subject in their ownright."
David Chalmers, Australian National University