Christopher Hitchcock (Ed

Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science

Ed. by Christopher Hitchcock

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science contains sixteen original essays by leading authors in the philosophy of science, each one defending the affirmative or negative answer to one of eight specific questions, including: Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?
Brings together fresh debates on eight of the most controversial issues in the philosophy of science.
Questions addressed include: "Are there laws of social science?"; "Are causes physically connected to their effects?"; "Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection?"
Each question is treated by a pair of opposing essays written by eminent scholars, and especially commissioned for the volume.
Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion.
Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, whilst also capturing the imagination of professional philosophers.

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Produktdetails

• Contemporary Debates in Philosophy
• Verlag: Blackwell Publishers
• Seitenzahl: 348
• Erscheinungstermin: 9. Januar 2004
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 244mm x 170mm x 20mm
• Gewicht: 655g
• ISBN-13: 9781405101523
• ISBN-10: 1405101520
• Artikelnr.: 13605277

Autorenporträt

Christopher Hitchcock is Professor of Philosophy at the California Institute of Technology. His articles have appeared in journals such as The Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and Synthese.

Inhaltsangabe

Notes on Contributors
Preface
Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?
Part I: Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?
1. Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism
James Robert Brown, University of Toronto
2. Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism
John Norton, University of Pittsburgh
Part II: Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or
Justification?
3. Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation
Patrick Maher, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
4. Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification
Kevin Kelly, Carnegie Mellon University and Clark Glymour, Carnegie Mellon
University
Part III: Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the
Unobservable Entities it Postulates?
5. A Theory's Predictive Success Can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable
Entities it Postulates
Jarrett Leplin, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
6. A Theory's Predictive Success Does not Warrant Belief in the
Unobservable Entities it Postulates
André Kukla, University of Toronto and Joel Walmsley, University of Toronto
Part IV: Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?
7. There are no Laws in the Social Sciences
John Roberts, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
8. There are Laws in the Social Sciences
Harold Kincaid, University of Alabama at Birmingham
Part V: Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?
9. Causes are Physically Connected to Their Effects: Why Preventers and
Omissions are not Causes
Phil Dowe, University of Queensland, Australia
10. Causes Need Not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for
Negative Causation
Jonathan Schaffer, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Part VI: Is There a Puzzle about the Low Entropy Past?
11. On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why There is Still a Puzzle About
the Low Entropy Past
Huw Price, University of Edinburgh
12. There is No Puzzle About the Low Entropy Past
Craig Callender
Part VII: Do Genes Encode Information About Phenotypic Traits
13. Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits
Sahotra Sarkar, University of Texas at Austin
14. Genes Do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits
Peter Godfrey-Smith, Stanford University
Part VIII: Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?
15. The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection
Peter Carruthers, University of Maryland
16. The Mind is Not (Just) a System of Modules Shaped (Just) by Natural
Selection
Fiona Cowie, California Institute of Technology and James Woodward,
California Institute of Technology
Index

Rezensionen

"This book offers an excellent way into both general philosophy of science and the important foundational issues that are generated by particular special sciences. The contributions are of the highest quality, and range from the epistemology of thought-experiments to the relationship between genes and whole organisms. The pairing of essays defending opposing points of view shows readers that philosophy of science is full of live issues that demand scientifically well-informed and philosophically sophisticated debate." James Ladyman, University of Bristol

"The essays in this invaluable collection are splendid and spirited, and they manage to encompass a broad range of the most exciting debates in philosophy of science today. By juxtaposing rival viewpoints on the same questions, this collection is sure to provoke vigorous responses from students and their teachers alike." Marc Lange, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

"The volume gives a real taste of current philosophical debate. The debated issues are real and well-defined, and not obscure conflicts of various -isms whose philosophical relevance is only understood by the participants." Petri Ylikoski, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies