Michael McKenna is Professor of Philosophy and Keith Lehrer Chair, University of Arizona.
Inhaltsangabe
* Preface * Introduction: Moral Responsibility, Conversation and Meaning * Chapter 1: Responsibility: A Conceptual Map * 1. Kinds of Responsibility * 2. Morally Responsible Agency * 3. Moral Responsibility for Conduct * 4. Holding Morally Responsible * 5. Moral Responsibility, Entailment, and the Concept of Moral Responsibility * Chapter 2: Reorienting Strawson's Theory of Moral Responsibility * 1. Variations on Strawson's Theory * 2. Embracing and Developing Wallace's Principle (N) * 3. A Normative Interpretation versus an Extreme Metaphysical Interpretation * 4. Two Distinctions * 5. Resisting a Strawsonian Theme: The Explanatory Role of Holding Responsible * 6. A Modest Metaphysical Interpretation * Chapter 3: Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will * 1. A Strawsonian Quality of Will Thesis * 2. The Morally Reactive Attitudes and their Attendant Practices * 3. Pleas: Reasons to Modify the Reactive Attitudes * 3.1 Excuses and Justifications * 3.2 Exemptions * Chapter 4: Conversation and Responsibility * 1. The Intimate Link between Being and Holding Responsible * 2. Introducing a Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility * 3. Agent Meaning and Morally Responsible Agency * 4. Agent Meaning and Action Meaning * 5. What Kind of Meaning is Agent Meaning? * 6. The Place of Meaning in Other Theories of Responsibility * Chapter 5: Genuine Responsibility: Defending a Conversational Theory * 1. A Robinson-Crusoe-type Objection * 2. Why Affect? * 3. Moral Responsibility without Desert? * 4. Moral Responsibility with Desert? * 4.1 Basic Desert * 4.2 Ultimate Responsibility and What is Deserved * 4.3 Axiological, Deontological, or Both? * Chapter 6: Conversation and Deserved Blame * 1. In Search of Desert Thesis * 2. What's the Harm in Blaming? * 3. Articulating a Desert Thesis for Blame * 4. A Challenge for the Moral Responsibility Skeptic * Chapter 7: Blame's Warrant * 1. The Challenge of Proper Warrant * 2. Justifying Blame in the Absence of Desert * 3. Justifying Blame by Way of Non-Basic Desert * 4. Why not Basic Desert? * 5. Accounting for Blame's Warrant * Chapter 8: Conversation and the Scope of Moral Responsibility * 1. Blaming in the Absence of the Blamed * 2. A Restrictive View of Moral Responsibility's Scope * 3. Blameworthiness for Bad Acts? * 4. Blameworthiness for the Nonvoluntary? * 5. Conversation and a Unified Account of Moral Responsibility's Scope * Chapter 9: Conclusion *
* Preface * Introduction: Moral Responsibility, Conversation and Meaning * Chapter 1: Responsibility: A Conceptual Map * 1. Kinds of Responsibility * 2. Morally Responsible Agency * 3. Moral Responsibility for Conduct * 4. Holding Morally Responsible * 5. Moral Responsibility, Entailment, and the Concept of Moral Responsibility * Chapter 2: Reorienting Strawson's Theory of Moral Responsibility * 1. Variations on Strawson's Theory * 2. Embracing and Developing Wallace's Principle (N) * 3. A Normative Interpretation versus an Extreme Metaphysical Interpretation * 4. Two Distinctions * 5. Resisting a Strawsonian Theme: The Explanatory Role of Holding Responsible * 6. A Modest Metaphysical Interpretation * Chapter 3: Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will * 1. A Strawsonian Quality of Will Thesis * 2. The Morally Reactive Attitudes and their Attendant Practices * 3. Pleas: Reasons to Modify the Reactive Attitudes * 3.1 Excuses and Justifications * 3.2 Exemptions * Chapter 4: Conversation and Responsibility * 1. The Intimate Link between Being and Holding Responsible * 2. Introducing a Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility * 3. Agent Meaning and Morally Responsible Agency * 4. Agent Meaning and Action Meaning * 5. What Kind of Meaning is Agent Meaning? * 6. The Place of Meaning in Other Theories of Responsibility * Chapter 5: Genuine Responsibility: Defending a Conversational Theory * 1. A Robinson-Crusoe-type Objection * 2. Why Affect? * 3. Moral Responsibility without Desert? * 4. Moral Responsibility with Desert? * 4.1 Basic Desert * 4.2 Ultimate Responsibility and What is Deserved * 4.3 Axiological, Deontological, or Both? * Chapter 6: Conversation and Deserved Blame * 1. In Search of Desert Thesis * 2. What's the Harm in Blaming? * 3. Articulating a Desert Thesis for Blame * 4. A Challenge for the Moral Responsibility Skeptic * Chapter 7: Blame's Warrant * 1. The Challenge of Proper Warrant * 2. Justifying Blame in the Absence of Desert * 3. Justifying Blame by Way of Non-Basic Desert * 4. Why not Basic Desert? * 5. Accounting for Blame's Warrant * Chapter 8: Conversation and the Scope of Moral Responsibility * 1. Blaming in the Absence of the Blamed * 2. A Restrictive View of Moral Responsibility's Scope * 3. Blameworthiness for Bad Acts? * 4. Blameworthiness for the Nonvoluntary? * 5. Conversation and a Unified Account of Moral Responsibility's Scope * Chapter 9: Conclusion *
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