Joseph A. McCahery / Piet Moerland / Theo Raaijmakers / Luc Renneboog (eds.)
Corporate Governance Regimes
Convergence and Diversity
Herausgeber: McCahery, Joseph; Raaijmakers, Theo; Moerland, Piet; Renneboog, Luc
Joseph A. McCahery / Piet Moerland / Theo Raaijmakers / Luc Renneboog (eds.)
Corporate Governance Regimes
Convergence and Diversity
Herausgeber: McCahery, Joseph; Raaijmakers, Theo; Moerland, Piet; Renneboog, Luc
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This volume provides an up-to-the-minute survey of the field of corporate governance, focusing particularly on issues of convergence and diversity. A number of topics are discussed including bankruptcy procedures, initial public offerings, the role of large stakes, comparative corporate governance, and institutional investors.
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This volume provides an up-to-the-minute survey of the field of corporate governance, focusing particularly on issues of convergence and diversity. A number of topics are discussed including bankruptcy procedures, initial public offerings, the role of large stakes, comparative corporate governance, and institutional investors.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 718
- Erscheinungstermin: 5. Dezember 2002
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 242mm x 164mm x 47mm
- Gewicht: 1138g
- ISBN-13: 9780199247875
- ISBN-10: 0199247870
- Artikelnr.: 20993226
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
- Verlag: Hurst & Co.
- Seitenzahl: 718
- Erscheinungstermin: 5. Dezember 2002
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 242mm x 164mm x 47mm
- Gewicht: 1138g
- ISBN-13: 9780199247875
- ISBN-10: 0199247870
- Artikelnr.: 20993226
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
Joseph A. McCahery is Professor of International Business Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law and the Center for Company Law. He holds a visiting appointment at Leiden University Faculty of Law. Piet Moerland is Professor of Corporate Governance at Tilburg University where he teaches courses on mergers and acquisitions and corporate governance. M.J.G.C. (Theo) Raaijmakers is Professor of Corporate Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law. Luc Renneboog is Associate Professor at the Department of Finance of Tilburg University and research fellow at the Center for Economic Research (Tilburg).
* 1: J. McCahery and L. Renneboog: Introduction
* I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes
* 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate
Law?
* 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions
to the Separation of Ownership and Control?
* 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Control
* 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the
Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom
* II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe
* 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act
* 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance
Patterns in Western Europe?
* III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe
* 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations?
* 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the
Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands
* 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO
Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French
Companies
* IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures
* 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model
* 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and
Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for
Product and Capital Market Competition
* 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm
Performance and Economic Growth
* V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm
* 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining
and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK
* 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American
Bankruptcy Procedures
* 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution
Threats in Different Financial Systems
* 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy
* VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance
* 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a
Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders
* 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds
* VII. Executive Compensation
* 27: R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog: Cash-Based Executive
Compensation in Spain and the UK
* 28: P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom: Employee
Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands
* I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes
* 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate
Law?
* 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions
to the Separation of Ownership and Control?
* 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Control
* 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the
Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom
* II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe
* 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act
* 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance
Patterns in Western Europe?
* III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe
* 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations?
* 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the
Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands
* 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO
Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French
Companies
* IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures
* 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model
* 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and
Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for
Product and Capital Market Competition
* 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm
Performance and Economic Growth
* V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm
* 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining
and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK
* 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American
Bankruptcy Procedures
* 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution
Threats in Different Financial Systems
* 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy
* VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance
* 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a
Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders
* 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds
* VII. Executive Compensation
* 27: R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog: Cash-Based Executive
Compensation in Spain and the UK
* 28: P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom: Employee
Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands
* 1: J. McCahery and L. Renneboog: Introduction
* I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes
* 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate
Law?
* 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions
to the Separation of Ownership and Control?
* 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Control
* 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the
Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom
* II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe
* 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act
* 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance
Patterns in Western Europe?
* III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe
* 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations?
* 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the
Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands
* 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO
Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French
Companies
* IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures
* 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model
* 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and
Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for
Product and Capital Market Competition
* 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm
Performance and Economic Growth
* V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm
* 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining
and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK
* 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American
Bankruptcy Procedures
* 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution
Threats in Different Financial Systems
* 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy
* VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance
* 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a
Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders
* 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds
* VII. Executive Compensation
* 27: R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog: Cash-Based Executive
Compensation in Spain and the UK
* 28: P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom: Employee
Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands
* I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes
* 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate
Law?
* 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions
to the Separation of Ownership and Control?
* 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from
Control
* 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the
Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom
* II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe
* 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act
* 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance
Patterns in Western Europe?
* III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe
* 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations?
* 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the
Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands
* 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO
Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French
Companies
* IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures
* 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model
* 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and
Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for
Product and Capital Market Competition
* 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm
Performance and Economic Growth
* V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm
* 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining
and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK
* 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American
Bankruptcy Procedures
* 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution
Threats in Different Financial Systems
* 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy
* VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance
* 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a
Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders
* 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate
Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds
* VII. Executive Compensation
* 27: R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog: Cash-Based Executive
Compensation in Spain and the UK
* 28: P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom: Employee
Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands