Preface; Part 1. Introduction: 1. Introduction, purpose, and overview
Andrew F. Daughety; Part II. Background: 2. Of the competition of producers
Augustin Cournot (translation by Nathanial T. Bacon); 3. Review of Walras's
Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale and Cournot's Reserches sur les
principles mathématiques de la théorie des richesses Joseph Bertrand
(translation by James W. Friedman); 4. Non-cooperative games John Nash;
Part III. Examining Cournot's Model: 5. On the existence of Cournot
equilibrium William Novshek; 6. Collusive behavior in non-cooperative
epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives Roy Radner; 7.
A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames James W. Friedman; 8.
Reconsidering Cournot: the Cournot equilibrium is consistent Andrew F.
Daughety; 9. An experimental test of the consistent-conjectures hypothesis
Charles A. Holt; 10. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield
Cournot outcomes David M. Kreps and José A. Scheinkman; 11. On the
efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation
Xavier Vives; 12. Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of
uncertainty Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer; Part IV. Applications: 13.
Cournot and Walras equilibrium William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein; 14.
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand Xavier Vives; 15.
Information transmission - Cournot and Bertrand equilibria Esther Gal-Or;
16. Uncertainty resolution, private information aggregation, and the
Cournot competitive limit Thomas R. Palfrey; 17. Losses from horizontal
merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on
Cournot-Nash equilibrium Stephen W. Salant, Sheldon Switzer, and Robert J.
Reynolds; 18. Delegation and the theory of the firm John Vickers; 19. A
study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886 Robert
H. Porter; 20. Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability
effect James A. Brander and Tracy R. Lewis.
