This volume focuses on the properties and uses of Cournot's model of competition among the few.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Preface; Part 1. Introduction: 1. Introduction, purpose, and overview Andrew F. Daughety; Part II. Background: 2. Of the competition of producers Augustin Cournot (translation by Nathanial T. Bacon); 3. Review of Walras's Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale and Cournot's Reserches sur les principles mathématiques de la théorie des richesses Joseph Bertrand (translation by James W. Friedman); 4. Non-cooperative games John Nash; Part III. Examining Cournot's Model: 5. On the existence of Cournot equilibrium William Novshek; 6. Collusive behavior in non-cooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives Roy Radner; 7. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames James W. Friedman; 8. Reconsidering Cournot: the Cournot equilibrium is consistent Andrew F. Daughety; 9. An experimental test of the consistent-conjectures hypothesis Charles A. Holt; 10. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes David M. Kreps and José A. Scheinkman; 11. On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation Xavier Vives; 12. Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of uncertainty Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer; Part IV. Applications: 13. Cournot and Walras equilibrium William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein; 14. Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand Xavier Vives; 15. Information transmission - Cournot and Bertrand equilibria Esther Gal-Or; 16. Uncertainty resolution, private information aggregation, and the Cournot competitive limit Thomas R. Palfrey; 17. Losses from horizontal merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium Stephen W. Salant, Sheldon Switzer, and Robert J. Reynolds; 18. Delegation and the theory of the firm John Vickers; 19. A study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880¿1886 Robert H. Porter; 20. Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect James A. Brander and Tracy R. Lewis.
Preface; Part 1. Introduction: 1. Introduction, purpose, and overview Andrew F. Daughety; Part II. Background: 2. Of the competition of producers Augustin Cournot (translation by Nathanial T. Bacon); 3. Review of Walras's Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale and Cournot's Reserches sur les principles mathématiques de la théorie des richesses Joseph Bertrand (translation by James W. Friedman); 4. Non-cooperative games John Nash; Part III. Examining Cournot's Model: 5. On the existence of Cournot equilibrium William Novshek; 6. Collusive behavior in non-cooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives Roy Radner; 7. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames James W. Friedman; 8. Reconsidering Cournot: the Cournot equilibrium is consistent Andrew F. Daughety; 9. An experimental test of the consistent-conjectures hypothesis Charles A. Holt; 10. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes David M. Kreps and José A. Scheinkman; 11. On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation Xavier Vives; 12. Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of uncertainty Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer; Part IV. Applications: 13. Cournot and Walras equilibrium William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein; 14. Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand Xavier Vives; 15. Information transmission - Cournot and Bertrand equilibria Esther Gal-Or; 16. Uncertainty resolution, private information aggregation, and the Cournot competitive limit Thomas R. Palfrey; 17. Losses from horizontal merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium Stephen W. Salant, Sheldon Switzer, and Robert J. Reynolds; 18. Delegation and the theory of the firm John Vickers; 19. A study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880¿1886 Robert H. Porter; 20. Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect James A. Brander and Tracy R. Lewis.
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