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Damon V. Coletta is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. He is Editor of Space and Defense, the journal of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies.
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Damon V. Coletta is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. He is Editor of Space and Defense, the journal of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 248
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. Mai 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 18mm
- Gewicht: 458g
- ISBN-13: 9780804798938
- ISBN-10: 0804798931
- Artikelnr.: 44382429
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 248
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. Mai 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 18mm
- Gewicht: 458g
- ISBN-13: 9780804798938
- ISBN-10: 0804798931
- Artikelnr.: 44382429
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- 06621 890
Damon V. Coletta is Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy. He is Editor of Space and Defense, the journal of the Eisenhower Center for Space and Defense Studies.
Contents and Abstracts
1A Second American Century
chapter abstract
The question of whether there will be a second American Century is placed
in the context of established literatures on balance of power and fleeting
hegemony in the history of international relations. One way for the United
States to break the Thucydidean cycle of rise and fall for great powers is
to work toward Robert Gilpin's ideal of the Scientific State. In an era of
globalization, this means not only promoting science for harvesting
superior technologies but appreciating all important pathways connecting
achievement in science to international influence. Case studies are
introduced to illustrate three civilizational pathways. Domestic science
and technology policy shows how American democracy tightens the noose on
pure science for purposes of state. Similar overemphasis on exclusive
technology undermines U.S. diplomacy with rising power Brazil as well as
U.S. efforts to foster transnational stewardship in the utilization of
outer space.
2Science and the Hegemon: Speaking Truth to Power
chapter abstract
The problem of how Science relates to world power is part of a more
profound reflection on how truth claims in general fare amidst the
necessities of state organization. The truth-power dialectic is as old as
Western political theory. Indeed, it infuses most canonical treatments of
ideal political order from Plato's philosopher-king to the United States
Constitution and beyond. Democratic regimes thrive on transparency and
accountability while modern scientific truth advances on professionalism,
which requires specialization. Democracies, then, face significant hurdles
before they can arrive as a Scientific State. Specifically, they must learn
to manage a pervasive principal-agent dilemma, permitting scientists
autonomy to be productive, even when commercial or military technology
might be deferred in the process. For democracy to strike the proper
balance between expert discretion and public accountability requires a
citizenry educated enough to know how to invest its trust.
3Power, Polarity, and Hegemony in the 21st Century
chapter abstract
A hegemonic turn toward Science makes sense as a strategy for preserving
international influence if hegemony involves more than imperial control
over nominal states, if power distribution in the system is multipolar
rather than unipolar, and if power itself derives from something beyond
superior military and economic resources. Acknowledging that power is
contextual-that it also depends on the medium through which it influences
target states-leads system analysis away from unipolarity and toward the
more sensible reading of a multipolar distribution of power. Multipolarity
places greater premium on hegemony as a mode of influence, which connotes
legitimacy to solve global problems, versus empire as material control.
Under present structural conditions of a loose, multipolar system that
dissipates much of the energy from a preeminent state's military action,
circumstances are ripe for fresh consideration of three civilizational
pathways by which Science relates to international influence.
4Science and the American State: Mobilizing Democracy
chapter abstract
The U.S. Science Establishment has responded more to the demands of a
consumer oriented democracy than to solving modern dilemmas involving the
professions. The United States' purest engagement with Science may have
been shortly after World War II when much of the best scientific work was
being supported by a single agency: the Office of Naval Research. As more
mission agencies came on line, pressures increased from Congress and
ultimately the American people to crowd out basic research in favor of
technology development. This shift undermined the value of national science
as a kind of elixir, or moderating influence, on the rougher edges of
American democracy. Restoring balanced national investment across
scientific achievement and pursuit of technology will be more feasible if
democracy is mobilized through improvements in general education, building
trust between science professions and the American people.
5Science and Diplomacy: U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Rest
chapter abstract
Diplomatic relationships between the U.S. hegemon and rising powers depend
on many variables, but U.S. insistence on putting technology first in its
scientific diplomacy highlights present power disparities and disdains
opportunities for building trust through joint scientific achievement,
thereby exacerbating predictable suspicion on the part of candidate
strategic partners. The case of Brazil, an emerging power ostensibly within
the fold of U.S. regional hegemony, illustrates how competitive or
predatory technology policies can poison the well, even for a confident
partner with a robust scientific tradition. Concerns attending U.S. science
& technology on offer seep into general bilateral relations, complicating
cooperation on major economic issues like trade and investment, and
political issues like reining in Iran's nuclear program or engaging China.
At the international level, between states, neglecting Science makes U.S.
hegemony more costly to sustain.
6Science and Global Governance at the Final Frontier
chapter abstract
Scientific achievement on the part of a hegemon facilitates cooperation
among heterogeneous stakeholders attempting to address transnational
challenges. With technological progress and increasing globalization, more
economic, environmental, and human security problems are recognized as
demanding coordination among states and non-governmental organizations in
multiple regions of the world. In such forums, classic accoutrements of
power and influence do not function as normal. Indeed, they function better
if the United States appears qualified to tackle transnational challenges
with high scientific content, and if the hegemon's clear commitment to
Science as a human enterprise extends beyond the narrow purpose of
leveraging proprietary technology for national power advantage. Governance
of the global commons, including economically significant orbits in space,
involves both cooperation and competitive impulses. Hard core technological
approaches impede consensus and ultimately frustrate the United States,
since even the U.S. hegemon cannot protect the commons on its own.
7Science, Grand Strategy, and Prospects for American Influence
chapter abstract
This project draws deeply from schools of thought on international
relations and world order, especially realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Liberal institutionalism, in particular, is implicated
because a hegemon's venture to embrace Science-like liberal institutions to
expand freedom and celebrate the dignity of the individual-is a variant of
grand strategy to escape the old Thucydidean cycle, which condemns all
great powers and their empires, once they arise, to decline and fall.
Scientific excellence, however, thrives in tension with some liberal and
communitarian ideals. If American democracy is to remain hegemonic for a
second century, U.S. citizens need to open their eyes to certain political
responsibilities of a Scientific State. It is for them to elect strategic
leaders who balance domestic investment in science apart from technology,
bear a system leader's diplomatic sensibility for other states' welfare,
and accept a generous share of costs in resolving transnational challenges.
1A Second American Century
chapter abstract
The question of whether there will be a second American Century is placed
in the context of established literatures on balance of power and fleeting
hegemony in the history of international relations. One way for the United
States to break the Thucydidean cycle of rise and fall for great powers is
to work toward Robert Gilpin's ideal of the Scientific State. In an era of
globalization, this means not only promoting science for harvesting
superior technologies but appreciating all important pathways connecting
achievement in science to international influence. Case studies are
introduced to illustrate three civilizational pathways. Domestic science
and technology policy shows how American democracy tightens the noose on
pure science for purposes of state. Similar overemphasis on exclusive
technology undermines U.S. diplomacy with rising power Brazil as well as
U.S. efforts to foster transnational stewardship in the utilization of
outer space.
2Science and the Hegemon: Speaking Truth to Power
chapter abstract
The problem of how Science relates to world power is part of a more
profound reflection on how truth claims in general fare amidst the
necessities of state organization. The truth-power dialectic is as old as
Western political theory. Indeed, it infuses most canonical treatments of
ideal political order from Plato's philosopher-king to the United States
Constitution and beyond. Democratic regimes thrive on transparency and
accountability while modern scientific truth advances on professionalism,
which requires specialization. Democracies, then, face significant hurdles
before they can arrive as a Scientific State. Specifically, they must learn
to manage a pervasive principal-agent dilemma, permitting scientists
autonomy to be productive, even when commercial or military technology
might be deferred in the process. For democracy to strike the proper
balance between expert discretion and public accountability requires a
citizenry educated enough to know how to invest its trust.
3Power, Polarity, and Hegemony in the 21st Century
chapter abstract
A hegemonic turn toward Science makes sense as a strategy for preserving
international influence if hegemony involves more than imperial control
over nominal states, if power distribution in the system is multipolar
rather than unipolar, and if power itself derives from something beyond
superior military and economic resources. Acknowledging that power is
contextual-that it also depends on the medium through which it influences
target states-leads system analysis away from unipolarity and toward the
more sensible reading of a multipolar distribution of power. Multipolarity
places greater premium on hegemony as a mode of influence, which connotes
legitimacy to solve global problems, versus empire as material control.
Under present structural conditions of a loose, multipolar system that
dissipates much of the energy from a preeminent state's military action,
circumstances are ripe for fresh consideration of three civilizational
pathways by which Science relates to international influence.
4Science and the American State: Mobilizing Democracy
chapter abstract
The U.S. Science Establishment has responded more to the demands of a
consumer oriented democracy than to solving modern dilemmas involving the
professions. The United States' purest engagement with Science may have
been shortly after World War II when much of the best scientific work was
being supported by a single agency: the Office of Naval Research. As more
mission agencies came on line, pressures increased from Congress and
ultimately the American people to crowd out basic research in favor of
technology development. This shift undermined the value of national science
as a kind of elixir, or moderating influence, on the rougher edges of
American democracy. Restoring balanced national investment across
scientific achievement and pursuit of technology will be more feasible if
democracy is mobilized through improvements in general education, building
trust between science professions and the American people.
5Science and Diplomacy: U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Rest
chapter abstract
Diplomatic relationships between the U.S. hegemon and rising powers depend
on many variables, but U.S. insistence on putting technology first in its
scientific diplomacy highlights present power disparities and disdains
opportunities for building trust through joint scientific achievement,
thereby exacerbating predictable suspicion on the part of candidate
strategic partners. The case of Brazil, an emerging power ostensibly within
the fold of U.S. regional hegemony, illustrates how competitive or
predatory technology policies can poison the well, even for a confident
partner with a robust scientific tradition. Concerns attending U.S. science
& technology on offer seep into general bilateral relations, complicating
cooperation on major economic issues like trade and investment, and
political issues like reining in Iran's nuclear program or engaging China.
At the international level, between states, neglecting Science makes U.S.
hegemony more costly to sustain.
6Science and Global Governance at the Final Frontier
chapter abstract
Scientific achievement on the part of a hegemon facilitates cooperation
among heterogeneous stakeholders attempting to address transnational
challenges. With technological progress and increasing globalization, more
economic, environmental, and human security problems are recognized as
demanding coordination among states and non-governmental organizations in
multiple regions of the world. In such forums, classic accoutrements of
power and influence do not function as normal. Indeed, they function better
if the United States appears qualified to tackle transnational challenges
with high scientific content, and if the hegemon's clear commitment to
Science as a human enterprise extends beyond the narrow purpose of
leveraging proprietary technology for national power advantage. Governance
of the global commons, including economically significant orbits in space,
involves both cooperation and competitive impulses. Hard core technological
approaches impede consensus and ultimately frustrate the United States,
since even the U.S. hegemon cannot protect the commons on its own.
7Science, Grand Strategy, and Prospects for American Influence
chapter abstract
This project draws deeply from schools of thought on international
relations and world order, especially realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Liberal institutionalism, in particular, is implicated
because a hegemon's venture to embrace Science-like liberal institutions to
expand freedom and celebrate the dignity of the individual-is a variant of
grand strategy to escape the old Thucydidean cycle, which condemns all
great powers and their empires, once they arise, to decline and fall.
Scientific excellence, however, thrives in tension with some liberal and
communitarian ideals. If American democracy is to remain hegemonic for a
second century, U.S. citizens need to open their eyes to certain political
responsibilities of a Scientific State. It is for them to elect strategic
leaders who balance domestic investment in science apart from technology,
bear a system leader's diplomatic sensibility for other states' welfare,
and accept a generous share of costs in resolving transnational challenges.
Contents and Abstracts
1A Second American Century
chapter abstract
The question of whether there will be a second American Century is placed
in the context of established literatures on balance of power and fleeting
hegemony in the history of international relations. One way for the United
States to break the Thucydidean cycle of rise and fall for great powers is
to work toward Robert Gilpin's ideal of the Scientific State. In an era of
globalization, this means not only promoting science for harvesting
superior technologies but appreciating all important pathways connecting
achievement in science to international influence. Case studies are
introduced to illustrate three civilizational pathways. Domestic science
and technology policy shows how American democracy tightens the noose on
pure science for purposes of state. Similar overemphasis on exclusive
technology undermines U.S. diplomacy with rising power Brazil as well as
U.S. efforts to foster transnational stewardship in the utilization of
outer space.
2Science and the Hegemon: Speaking Truth to Power
chapter abstract
The problem of how Science relates to world power is part of a more
profound reflection on how truth claims in general fare amidst the
necessities of state organization. The truth-power dialectic is as old as
Western political theory. Indeed, it infuses most canonical treatments of
ideal political order from Plato's philosopher-king to the United States
Constitution and beyond. Democratic regimes thrive on transparency and
accountability while modern scientific truth advances on professionalism,
which requires specialization. Democracies, then, face significant hurdles
before they can arrive as a Scientific State. Specifically, they must learn
to manage a pervasive principal-agent dilemma, permitting scientists
autonomy to be productive, even when commercial or military technology
might be deferred in the process. For democracy to strike the proper
balance between expert discretion and public accountability requires a
citizenry educated enough to know how to invest its trust.
3Power, Polarity, and Hegemony in the 21st Century
chapter abstract
A hegemonic turn toward Science makes sense as a strategy for preserving
international influence if hegemony involves more than imperial control
over nominal states, if power distribution in the system is multipolar
rather than unipolar, and if power itself derives from something beyond
superior military and economic resources. Acknowledging that power is
contextual-that it also depends on the medium through which it influences
target states-leads system analysis away from unipolarity and toward the
more sensible reading of a multipolar distribution of power. Multipolarity
places greater premium on hegemony as a mode of influence, which connotes
legitimacy to solve global problems, versus empire as material control.
Under present structural conditions of a loose, multipolar system that
dissipates much of the energy from a preeminent state's military action,
circumstances are ripe for fresh consideration of three civilizational
pathways by which Science relates to international influence.
4Science and the American State: Mobilizing Democracy
chapter abstract
The U.S. Science Establishment has responded more to the demands of a
consumer oriented democracy than to solving modern dilemmas involving the
professions. The United States' purest engagement with Science may have
been shortly after World War II when much of the best scientific work was
being supported by a single agency: the Office of Naval Research. As more
mission agencies came on line, pressures increased from Congress and
ultimately the American people to crowd out basic research in favor of
technology development. This shift undermined the value of national science
as a kind of elixir, or moderating influence, on the rougher edges of
American democracy. Restoring balanced national investment across
scientific achievement and pursuit of technology will be more feasible if
democracy is mobilized through improvements in general education, building
trust between science professions and the American people.
5Science and Diplomacy: U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Rest
chapter abstract
Diplomatic relationships between the U.S. hegemon and rising powers depend
on many variables, but U.S. insistence on putting technology first in its
scientific diplomacy highlights present power disparities and disdains
opportunities for building trust through joint scientific achievement,
thereby exacerbating predictable suspicion on the part of candidate
strategic partners. The case of Brazil, an emerging power ostensibly within
the fold of U.S. regional hegemony, illustrates how competitive or
predatory technology policies can poison the well, even for a confident
partner with a robust scientific tradition. Concerns attending U.S. science
& technology on offer seep into general bilateral relations, complicating
cooperation on major economic issues like trade and investment, and
political issues like reining in Iran's nuclear program or engaging China.
At the international level, between states, neglecting Science makes U.S.
hegemony more costly to sustain.
6Science and Global Governance at the Final Frontier
chapter abstract
Scientific achievement on the part of a hegemon facilitates cooperation
among heterogeneous stakeholders attempting to address transnational
challenges. With technological progress and increasing globalization, more
economic, environmental, and human security problems are recognized as
demanding coordination among states and non-governmental organizations in
multiple regions of the world. In such forums, classic accoutrements of
power and influence do not function as normal. Indeed, they function better
if the United States appears qualified to tackle transnational challenges
with high scientific content, and if the hegemon's clear commitment to
Science as a human enterprise extends beyond the narrow purpose of
leveraging proprietary technology for national power advantage. Governance
of the global commons, including economically significant orbits in space,
involves both cooperation and competitive impulses. Hard core technological
approaches impede consensus and ultimately frustrate the United States,
since even the U.S. hegemon cannot protect the commons on its own.
7Science, Grand Strategy, and Prospects for American Influence
chapter abstract
This project draws deeply from schools of thought on international
relations and world order, especially realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Liberal institutionalism, in particular, is implicated
because a hegemon's venture to embrace Science-like liberal institutions to
expand freedom and celebrate the dignity of the individual-is a variant of
grand strategy to escape the old Thucydidean cycle, which condemns all
great powers and their empires, once they arise, to decline and fall.
Scientific excellence, however, thrives in tension with some liberal and
communitarian ideals. If American democracy is to remain hegemonic for a
second century, U.S. citizens need to open their eyes to certain political
responsibilities of a Scientific State. It is for them to elect strategic
leaders who balance domestic investment in science apart from technology,
bear a system leader's diplomatic sensibility for other states' welfare,
and accept a generous share of costs in resolving transnational challenges.
1A Second American Century
chapter abstract
The question of whether there will be a second American Century is placed
in the context of established literatures on balance of power and fleeting
hegemony in the history of international relations. One way for the United
States to break the Thucydidean cycle of rise and fall for great powers is
to work toward Robert Gilpin's ideal of the Scientific State. In an era of
globalization, this means not only promoting science for harvesting
superior technologies but appreciating all important pathways connecting
achievement in science to international influence. Case studies are
introduced to illustrate three civilizational pathways. Domestic science
and technology policy shows how American democracy tightens the noose on
pure science for purposes of state. Similar overemphasis on exclusive
technology undermines U.S. diplomacy with rising power Brazil as well as
U.S. efforts to foster transnational stewardship in the utilization of
outer space.
2Science and the Hegemon: Speaking Truth to Power
chapter abstract
The problem of how Science relates to world power is part of a more
profound reflection on how truth claims in general fare amidst the
necessities of state organization. The truth-power dialectic is as old as
Western political theory. Indeed, it infuses most canonical treatments of
ideal political order from Plato's philosopher-king to the United States
Constitution and beyond. Democratic regimes thrive on transparency and
accountability while modern scientific truth advances on professionalism,
which requires specialization. Democracies, then, face significant hurdles
before they can arrive as a Scientific State. Specifically, they must learn
to manage a pervasive principal-agent dilemma, permitting scientists
autonomy to be productive, even when commercial or military technology
might be deferred in the process. For democracy to strike the proper
balance between expert discretion and public accountability requires a
citizenry educated enough to know how to invest its trust.
3Power, Polarity, and Hegemony in the 21st Century
chapter abstract
A hegemonic turn toward Science makes sense as a strategy for preserving
international influence if hegemony involves more than imperial control
over nominal states, if power distribution in the system is multipolar
rather than unipolar, and if power itself derives from something beyond
superior military and economic resources. Acknowledging that power is
contextual-that it also depends on the medium through which it influences
target states-leads system analysis away from unipolarity and toward the
more sensible reading of a multipolar distribution of power. Multipolarity
places greater premium on hegemony as a mode of influence, which connotes
legitimacy to solve global problems, versus empire as material control.
Under present structural conditions of a loose, multipolar system that
dissipates much of the energy from a preeminent state's military action,
circumstances are ripe for fresh consideration of three civilizational
pathways by which Science relates to international influence.
4Science and the American State: Mobilizing Democracy
chapter abstract
The U.S. Science Establishment has responded more to the demands of a
consumer oriented democracy than to solving modern dilemmas involving the
professions. The United States' purest engagement with Science may have
been shortly after World War II when much of the best scientific work was
being supported by a single agency: the Office of Naval Research. As more
mission agencies came on line, pressures increased from Congress and
ultimately the American people to crowd out basic research in favor of
technology development. This shift undermined the value of national science
as a kind of elixir, or moderating influence, on the rougher edges of
American democracy. Restoring balanced national investment across
scientific achievement and pursuit of technology will be more feasible if
democracy is mobilized through improvements in general education, building
trust between science professions and the American people.
5Science and Diplomacy: U.S. Hegemony and the Rise of the Rest
chapter abstract
Diplomatic relationships between the U.S. hegemon and rising powers depend
on many variables, but U.S. insistence on putting technology first in its
scientific diplomacy highlights present power disparities and disdains
opportunities for building trust through joint scientific achievement,
thereby exacerbating predictable suspicion on the part of candidate
strategic partners. The case of Brazil, an emerging power ostensibly within
the fold of U.S. regional hegemony, illustrates how competitive or
predatory technology policies can poison the well, even for a confident
partner with a robust scientific tradition. Concerns attending U.S. science
& technology on offer seep into general bilateral relations, complicating
cooperation on major economic issues like trade and investment, and
political issues like reining in Iran's nuclear program or engaging China.
At the international level, between states, neglecting Science makes U.S.
hegemony more costly to sustain.
6Science and Global Governance at the Final Frontier
chapter abstract
Scientific achievement on the part of a hegemon facilitates cooperation
among heterogeneous stakeholders attempting to address transnational
challenges. With technological progress and increasing globalization, more
economic, environmental, and human security problems are recognized as
demanding coordination among states and non-governmental organizations in
multiple regions of the world. In such forums, classic accoutrements of
power and influence do not function as normal. Indeed, they function better
if the United States appears qualified to tackle transnational challenges
with high scientific content, and if the hegemon's clear commitment to
Science as a human enterprise extends beyond the narrow purpose of
leveraging proprietary technology for national power advantage. Governance
of the global commons, including economically significant orbits in space,
involves both cooperation and competitive impulses. Hard core technological
approaches impede consensus and ultimately frustrate the United States,
since even the U.S. hegemon cannot protect the commons on its own.
7Science, Grand Strategy, and Prospects for American Influence
chapter abstract
This project draws deeply from schools of thought on international
relations and world order, especially realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. Liberal institutionalism, in particular, is implicated
because a hegemon's venture to embrace Science-like liberal institutions to
expand freedom and celebrate the dignity of the individual-is a variant of
grand strategy to escape the old Thucydidean cycle, which condemns all
great powers and their empires, once they arise, to decline and fall.
Scientific excellence, however, thrives in tension with some liberal and
communitarian ideals. If American democracy is to remain hegemonic for a
second century, U.S. citizens need to open their eyes to certain political
responsibilities of a Scientific State. It is for them to elect strategic
leaders who balance domestic investment in science apart from technology,
bear a system leader's diplomatic sensibility for other states' welfare,
and accept a generous share of costs in resolving transnational challenges.