This book is a study of how institutional instability affects judicial behavior under dictatorship and democracy.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Gretchen Helmke is an Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Rochester. Her research on comparative institutions and Latin American politics appears in several leading journals, including the American Political Science Review, Comparative Politics, and Desarollo Economico. Her research has received grants from the National Science Foundation and the Social Science Research Council. She has been a visiting research fellow at the Fundación Carlos Nino in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Inhaltsangabe
Part I. Ruling against the Rules: 1. Introduction 2. Actors, institutions, and mechanisms 3. Design and overview of the argument Part II. The Logic of Strategic Defection: 4. The standard strategic account 5. A new pattern of inter-branch relations 6. Modifying the separations-of-powers approach 7. Judicial motivations 8. Problems of information 9. Conclusion Part III. A Theory of Court-Executive Relations: Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, and Strategic Behavior: 10. Politics and uncertainty 11. The model 12. Discussion 13. Conclusion: testable hypotheses Part IV. Judges, Generals, and Presidents: Institutional Insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976-99: 14. The gap between formal and informal institutions 15. Judges under bayonets: the military 'Proceso', 1976-83 16. Judges under the Alfosín government 17. Judges under the (first) Menem government: the difficulty of democratic consolidation, 1989-95 18. Judges under the (Second) Menem government: the path toward democratic consolidation? 19. Conclusion: an analytic narrative of institutional insecurity Part V. The Reverse Legal-Political Cycle: An Analysis of Decision-Making on the Argentine Supreme Court: 20. Data and methodology 21. Timing 22. Importance 23. Participation 24. Target of the threat 25. Rival hypotheses: composition, legality, and the mix of cases 26. Conclusion Part VI. The Dynamics of Defection: Human Rights, Civil Liberties, and Presidential Power: 27. The military court and human rights 28. The Alfonsín Court and human and civil rights 29. The Menem-era court and presidential power 30. Conclusion: did defection work? 31. Epilogue: the court and the collapse of Argentina Part VII. Conclusion: Broader Lessons and Future Directions: 32. Strategic defection and the reverse-legal-political cycle 33. Strategic defection in comparative perspective 34. Further implications, future directions.
Part I. Ruling against the Rules: 1. Introduction; 2. Actors, institutions, and mechanisms; 3. Design and overview of the argument; Part II. The Logic of Strategic Defection: 4. The standard strategic account; 5. A new pattern of inter-branch relations; 6. Modifying the separations-of-powers approach; 7. Judicial motivations; 8. Problems of information; 9. Conclusion; Part III. A Theory of Court-Executive Relations: Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, and Strategic Behavior: 10. Politics and uncertainty; 11. The model; 12. Discussion; 13. Conclusion: testable hypotheses; Part IV. Judges, Generals, and Presidents: Institutional Insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976-99: 14. The gap between formal and informal institutions; 15. Judges under bayonets: the military 'Proceso', 1976-83; 16. Judges under the Alfosín government; 17. Judges under the (first) Menem government: the difficulty of democratic consolidation, 1989-95; 18. Judges under the (Second) Menem government:
Part I. Ruling against the Rules: 1. Introduction 2. Actors, institutions, and mechanisms 3. Design and overview of the argument Part II. The Logic of Strategic Defection: 4. The standard strategic account 5. A new pattern of inter-branch relations 6. Modifying the separations-of-powers approach 7. Judicial motivations 8. Problems of information 9. Conclusion Part III. A Theory of Court-Executive Relations: Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, and Strategic Behavior: 10. Politics and uncertainty 11. The model 12. Discussion 13. Conclusion: testable hypotheses Part IV. Judges, Generals, and Presidents: Institutional Insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976-99: 14. The gap between formal and informal institutions 15. Judges under bayonets: the military 'Proceso', 1976-83 16. Judges under the Alfosín government 17. Judges under the (first) Menem government: the difficulty of democratic consolidation, 1989-95 18. Judges under the (Second) Menem government: the path toward democratic consolidation? 19. Conclusion: an analytic narrative of institutional insecurity Part V. The Reverse Legal-Political Cycle: An Analysis of Decision-Making on the Argentine Supreme Court: 20. Data and methodology 21. Timing 22. Importance 23. Participation 24. Target of the threat 25. Rival hypotheses: composition, legality, and the mix of cases 26. Conclusion Part VI. The Dynamics of Defection: Human Rights, Civil Liberties, and Presidential Power: 27. The military court and human rights 28. The Alfonsín Court and human and civil rights 29. The Menem-era court and presidential power 30. Conclusion: did defection work? 31. Epilogue: the court and the collapse of Argentina Part VII. Conclusion: Broader Lessons and Future Directions: 32. Strategic defection and the reverse-legal-political cycle 33. Strategic defection in comparative perspective 34. Further implications, future directions.
Part I. Ruling against the Rules: 1. Introduction; 2. Actors, institutions, and mechanisms; 3. Design and overview of the argument; Part II. The Logic of Strategic Defection: 4. The standard strategic account; 5. A new pattern of inter-branch relations; 6. Modifying the separations-of-powers approach; 7. Judicial motivations; 8. Problems of information; 9. Conclusion; Part III. A Theory of Court-Executive Relations: Insecure Tenure, Incomplete Information, and Strategic Behavior: 10. Politics and uncertainty; 11. The model; 12. Discussion; 13. Conclusion: testable hypotheses; Part IV. Judges, Generals, and Presidents: Institutional Insecurity on the Argentine Supreme Court, 1976-99: 14. The gap between formal and informal institutions; 15. Judges under bayonets: the military 'Proceso', 1976-83; 16. Judges under the Alfosín government; 17. Judges under the (first) Menem government: the difficulty of democratic consolidation, 1989-95; 18. Judges under the (Second) Menem government:
Rezensionen
"Helmkes short but important work should be read by scholars working in judicial process, positive political theory, democratization, and comparative institutional analysis." Choice
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