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The 2008 financial crisis brought the far-reaching influence of credit ratings on capital markets into focus and confirmed doubts about the quality of ratings published by rating agencies. In the context of regulatory efforts to limit the influence of ratings, Marius Müller addresses the question to what extent investment funds are obliged to sell bonds that no longer comply with investment guidelines following a rating downgrade. Results of a statistical analysis of 200 European and U.S. fund prospectuses are evaluated in the light of regulatory objectives. Subsequently, a structural proposal for the formulation of investment guidelines is developed, accounting for the protection of investor interests and market functioning.