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This paper examines one aspect of warfare at the operational level, the defense, and attempts to identify how the elements of planning, preparation, and execution, previously applied in the conduct of the tactically-oriented Active Defense, must be modified with the adoption of our operationally-oriented AirLand Battle doctrine. Using Clausewitz's model for critical analysis, Gen R. E. Lee's 1862 fall campaign and the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 1862, are examined to identify the consequences of a tactical approach to battlefield defense. Finally, one operational alternative is proposed using concepts advocated by Clausewitz and the 1982 FM 100-5. This alternative is analyzed against the same strategic and tactical constraints and restrictions imposed upon Lee as the Confederate theater commander. From this analysis it becomes apparent that fundamental differences in tactical and operational approaches to the requirements of battlefield defense can be summarized as contrasts required in the commander's focus, purpose, and need to anticipate. This study also elaborates on the definition of the operational level of war provided in the current FM 100-5 and the concepts for defense as advocated by Clausewitz and adopted by AirLand Battle doctrine. Additionally, the two broad categories of defense, area and mobile, are examined against the requirements for an operational defense.