This volume focuses on modern economic analyses of deception in markets. The contributors offer a systematic account of how different approaches to modern economics deal with dishonesty and cheating in the marketplace. The particular focus is on economic concepts such as rationality and behaviour in relation to deception. Analyses are presented from the perspective of standard economic frameworks (i.e. game theory, new institutional economics, new classical macroeconomics) while behavioural developments (i.e. behavioural economics and finance) are referred to, challenging the basic economic…mehr
This volume focuses on modern economic analyses of deception in markets. The contributors offer a systematic account of how different approaches to modern economics deal with dishonesty and cheating in the marketplace. The particular focus is on economic concepts such as rationality and behaviour in relation to deception. Analyses are presented from the perspective of standard economic frameworks (i.e. game theory, new institutional economics, new classical macroeconomics) while behavioural developments (i.e. behavioural economics and finance) are referred to, challenging the basic economic concepts of rationality and self-interest. Finally, anthropological findings are used to contrast these economic conceptions of deception.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
JOSHUA COVAL Harvard Business School, USA RACHEL T. A. CROSON University of Pennsylvania, OPIM, The Wharton School, USA PAUL DUMOUCHEL Graduate School of Core Ethics and Frontier Science, Ritsumeikan University, Japan PAUL VAN DER GRIJP Université de Provence, France ALAN HAMLIN Department of Economics, University of Southampton, UK MARCÉL HENAFF Department of Cultural and Religious Studies, University of California, USA ELLEN HERTZ Université de Neuchâtel, Institut d'ethnologie, Switzerland DAVID HIRSHLEIFER Department of Finance, Ohio State University, USA GISELA KUBON-GILKE Evangelische Fachhochschule Darmstadt, Germany VINCENT-ANTONIN LÉPINAY Sociology Department, Columbia University, USA & Centre de Sociologie de 'Innovation, Ecole des Mines, France LAWRENCE S. MOSS Economics Department, Babson College, USA S. ABU TURAB RIZVI Department of Economics, University of Vermont, USA ESTHER-MIRJAM SENT Nijmegen School of Management, University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands SIEW HONG TEOH Department of Finance, Ohio State University, USA
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction; C.Gerschlager PART I: THE RATIONALITY OF DECEPTION Deception and Game Theory; S.A.T.Rizvi Rational Deception; P.Dumouchel A Deceptive Journey From Rational Expectations to Bounded Rationality; E-M.Sent PART II: BEHAVIOR AND INCENTIVES TO DECEIVE: THE SUCCESS OF DECEPTION IN MARKETS Deception in Markets: The Enron Case; C.Gerschlager Deception in Economics Experiments; R.T.A.Croson Self-Deception and Deception in Capital Markets; J.Coval, D.Hirshleifer & S.H.Teoh PART III: SUBJECTIVISM AND DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN MARKETS Price Theory and the Study of Deception in the Exchange Process; L.S.Moss PART IV: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATION: HOW TO CONTROL DECEPTION Deception, Regulation and Politics; A.Hamlin Deception, Self-Deception and New Institutional Economics; G.Kubon-Gilke PART V: PRECONDITIONS OF MARKETS AND DECEPTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Deception and Its Preconditions: Issues Raised by Financial Markets; V-A.Lépinay & E.Hertz Deception in Economic Anthropology; P.van der Grijp Gift Exchange, Play and Deception; M.Hénaff
Introduction; C.Gerschlager PART I: THE RATIONALITY OF DECEPTION Deception and Game Theory; S.A.T.Rizvi Rational Deception; P.Dumouchel A Deceptive Journey From Rational Expectations to Bounded Rationality; E-M.Sent PART II: BEHAVIOR AND INCENTIVES TO DECEIVE: THE SUCCESS OF DECEPTION IN MARKETS Deception in Markets: The Enron Case; C.Gerschlager Deception in Economics Experiments; R.T.A.Croson Self-Deception and Deception in Capital Markets; J.Coval, D.Hirshleifer & S.H.Teoh PART III: SUBJECTIVISM AND DECEPTIVE BEHAVIOR IN MARKETS Price Theory and the Study of Deception in the Exchange Process; L.S.Moss PART IV: SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATION: HOW TO CONTROL DECEPTION Deception, Regulation and Politics; A.Hamlin Deception, Self-Deception and New Institutional Economics; G.Kubon-Gilke PART V: PRECONDITIONS OF MARKETS AND DECEPTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Deception and Its Preconditions: Issues Raised by Financial Markets; V-A.Lépinay & E.Hertz Deception in Economic Anthropology; P.van der Grijp Gift Exchange, Play and Deception; M.Hénaff
Rezensionen
'Though deception, cheating, lying and fraud are common in the market system, remarkably they have been mostly overlooked by economists. This wonderfully diverse collection makes excellent contribution to changing this state of affairs by demonstrating the difference that deception makes to rationality theory and competition. Very much recommended for those interested in sorting out new directions in economic theory.' - Professor John Davis, University of Amsterdam and Marquette University
'With the experience of Enron and Parmalat still fresh in our minds, this volume supplies a timely and revealing discussion of deception: how it arises and what can be done about it. The insights of mainstream economics are supplemented by those of psychology and anthropology and the result is an exciting piece of social science.' - Professor Shaun Hargreaves-Heap, University of East Anglia, UK
'Caroline Gerschlager has assembled an international set of scholars from diverse disciplines to discuss a most timely subject - deception in markets and self-deception in human relations. The scholars do not only discuss what went wrong recently in markets in Europe and the US. They also discuss what might have gone wrong in the discipline of economics for its failure to anticipate the recent massive market as well as institutional failures.' - Elias L. Khalil, Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Germany
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