William P Fox
Decision Analysis Through Modeling and Game Theory
William P Fox
Decision Analysis Through Modeling and Game Theory
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This unique book presents decision analysis in the context of mathematical modeling and game theory. The author emphasizes and focuses on the model formulation and modeling building skills required for decision analysis, as well as the technology to support the analysis.
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This unique book presents decision analysis in the context of mathematical modeling and game theory. The author emphasizes and focuses on the model formulation and modeling building skills required for decision analysis, as well as the technology to support the analysis.
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: CRC Press
- Seitenzahl: 296
- Erscheinungstermin: 8. November 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 617g
- ISBN-13: 9781032721606
- ISBN-10: 103272160X
- Artikelnr.: 70679600
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
- Verlag: CRC Press
- Seitenzahl: 296
- Erscheinungstermin: 8. November 2024
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 19mm
- Gewicht: 617g
- ISBN-13: 9781032721606
- ISBN-10: 103272160X
- Artikelnr.: 70679600
- Herstellerkennzeichnung
- Libri GmbH
- Europaallee 1
- 36244 Bad Hersfeld
- gpsr@libri.de
Dr. William P. Fox is currently a visiting professor of Computational Operations Research at the College of William and Mary. He is an emeritus professor in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School and teaches a three-course sequence in mathematical modeling for decision making. He received his Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering from Clemson University. He has taught at the United States Military Academy for twelve years until retiring and at Francis Marion University where he was the chair of mathematics for eight years. He has many publications and scholarly activities including twenty plus books and one hundred and fifty journal articles. Books by William P. Fox from CRC Press: Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences with Modeling using R (w/Rodney X. Sturdivant, 2023, CRC Press Mathematical Modeling in the Age of the Pandemic, 2021, CRC Press. Advanced Problem Solving Using Maple: Applied Mathematics, Operations Research, Business Analytics, and Decision Analysis (w/William Bauldry), 2020, CRC Press. Mathematical Modeling with Excel (w/Brian Albright), 2020, CRC Press. Nonlinear Optimization: Models and Applications, 2020, CRC Press. Advanced Problem Solving with Maple: A First Course (w/William Bauldry), 2019. CRC Press. Mathematical Modeling for Business Analytics, 2018, CRC Press.
Chapter 1: Introduction to Decision Models 1.1 Overview of Decision Making
1.2 Decision Theory 1.3 Game Theory: Total Conflict Example 1.5: A Total
Conflict Game with Pure Strategies 1.4 Game Theory: Partial Conflict 1.5
Mathematical Modeling of Decisions 1.4 ILLUSTRATE EXAMPLES 1.5 Technology
Chapter 2 Decision Theory and Expected Value 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Expected
Value 2.3 Decisions Under Risk: Probabilities are known or estimated in
advance 2.4 Decisions under Uncertainty: Probabilities are not known nor
can they be estimated 2.5 Decision Trees 2.6 Sequential Decisions and
Conditional Probability (from Fox, Mathematical Modeling for Business
Analytics, Taylor and Francis, 2018) Chapter 3 Decisions under certainty:
Mathematical Programming Modeling: Linear, Integer, and Mixed Integer
Optimization 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Formulating Linear Programming Problems
3.3 Graphical Linear Programming 3.4 Linear Programming with Technology 3.5
Case Studies in Linear Programming Projects 3.5.1 Modeling of Ranking Units
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a LP 3.5.2 Recruiting Raleigh
Office (modified from McGrath, 2007) Chapter 4 Multi-Attribute Decision
Making using weighting schemes with SAW, AHP and TOPSIS 4.1 Weighting
Methods 4.1.1 Rank Order Centroid (ROC) 4.1.2 Ratio Method for Weights
4.1.3 Pairwise Comparison (AHP) 4.1.4 Entropy Method: 4.2 Simple Additive
Weights (SAW) Method 4.3 Weighted Product Method 4.4 Analytical Hierarchy
Process 4.5 Technique of Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal
Solution Methodology, Normalization, EXERCISES Chapter 4 CHAPTER 5 Game
Theory: Total Conflict 5.1 Introduction to Total Conflict Games 5.2 Models
with Pure Strategy Solutions 5.2.1 Movement Arrows with two players and a
payoff matrix: 5.2.2 Saddle Point Method 5.3 Dominance and Dominated
strategies Exercises Section 5.1 Pure Strategy Games 5.3 Mixed Strategy in
two player 2 strategy games 5.3 Linear Programming and Total Conflict Games
Chapter 6 Partial Conflict Games: The Classical Two-Player Games. Error!
Bookmark not defined. 6.1 Partial Conflict Simultaneous Games Introduction
6.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma 6.3 The Game of Chicken Chapter 7 Utility Theory
7.1 Introduction 7.2 Ordinal Numbers 7.3 Cardinal numbers 7.4 Utility 7.4
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities Applied to Game Theory. 7.5 An
alternative approach to the lottery method in utility theory for game
theory 7.5.1 Lottery Method Illustrated 7.5.2 AHP Method 7.5.3 AHP Example
in Game Theory 7.6 Summary and Conclusions Chapter 8. Nash Equilibrium and
Non-Cooperative Solutions in Partial Conflict Games 8.1 Introduction 8.2
Pure Strategies and Dominance review in symmetric games 8.3 Equalizing
Strategies 8.4 Prudential Strategies with LP 8.5 Applications EXERCISES
Chapter 9 Evolutionary stable Strategies 9.1 Introduction Exercises Chapter
9 Chapter 10 Communications 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Game of Chicken
Without Communication 10.3 The Game of Chicken With Communication 10.3.1
Moving First or Committing to Move First 10.3.2 Issuing a Threat 10.3.3
Issuing a Promise 10.4 Credibility Classical Game Theory and the Missile
Crisis (from Brahm ,1994) Theory of Moves and the Missile Crisis Chapter 10
Exercises Chapter 11 Nash Arbitration Method 11.1 Introduction to Nash
Arbitration 11.2 Methods without calculus 11.3 More than two strategies
11.4 Writer's Guild Strike example with cardinal numbers Introduction Nash
Arbitration Scheme Chapter 12 Three Person Games 12.1 Three Person Zero-Sum
games 12.2 Three-Person Partial Conflict Game ( Non-Zero Sum Game). 12.4
NON-ZERO Sum (non-constant sum) with no pure strategies. 12.5 3-Person game
with Technology Chapter 13 Extensive Form Games 13.1 Introduction Example
1. Kidnapping for ransom Applying TOM
1.2 Decision Theory 1.3 Game Theory: Total Conflict Example 1.5: A Total
Conflict Game with Pure Strategies 1.4 Game Theory: Partial Conflict 1.5
Mathematical Modeling of Decisions 1.4 ILLUSTRATE EXAMPLES 1.5 Technology
Chapter 2 Decision Theory and Expected Value 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Expected
Value 2.3 Decisions Under Risk: Probabilities are known or estimated in
advance 2.4 Decisions under Uncertainty: Probabilities are not known nor
can they be estimated 2.5 Decision Trees 2.6 Sequential Decisions and
Conditional Probability (from Fox, Mathematical Modeling for Business
Analytics, Taylor and Francis, 2018) Chapter 3 Decisions under certainty:
Mathematical Programming Modeling: Linear, Integer, and Mixed Integer
Optimization 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Formulating Linear Programming Problems
3.3 Graphical Linear Programming 3.4 Linear Programming with Technology 3.5
Case Studies in Linear Programming Projects 3.5.1 Modeling of Ranking Units
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a LP 3.5.2 Recruiting Raleigh
Office (modified from McGrath, 2007) Chapter 4 Multi-Attribute Decision
Making using weighting schemes with SAW, AHP and TOPSIS 4.1 Weighting
Methods 4.1.1 Rank Order Centroid (ROC) 4.1.2 Ratio Method for Weights
4.1.3 Pairwise Comparison (AHP) 4.1.4 Entropy Method: 4.2 Simple Additive
Weights (SAW) Method 4.3 Weighted Product Method 4.4 Analytical Hierarchy
Process 4.5 Technique of Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal
Solution Methodology, Normalization, EXERCISES Chapter 4 CHAPTER 5 Game
Theory: Total Conflict 5.1 Introduction to Total Conflict Games 5.2 Models
with Pure Strategy Solutions 5.2.1 Movement Arrows with two players and a
payoff matrix: 5.2.2 Saddle Point Method 5.3 Dominance and Dominated
strategies Exercises Section 5.1 Pure Strategy Games 5.3 Mixed Strategy in
two player 2 strategy games 5.3 Linear Programming and Total Conflict Games
Chapter 6 Partial Conflict Games: The Classical Two-Player Games. Error!
Bookmark not defined. 6.1 Partial Conflict Simultaneous Games Introduction
6.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma 6.3 The Game of Chicken Chapter 7 Utility Theory
7.1 Introduction 7.2 Ordinal Numbers 7.3 Cardinal numbers 7.4 Utility 7.4
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities Applied to Game Theory. 7.5 An
alternative approach to the lottery method in utility theory for game
theory 7.5.1 Lottery Method Illustrated 7.5.2 AHP Method 7.5.3 AHP Example
in Game Theory 7.6 Summary and Conclusions Chapter 8. Nash Equilibrium and
Non-Cooperative Solutions in Partial Conflict Games 8.1 Introduction 8.2
Pure Strategies and Dominance review in symmetric games 8.3 Equalizing
Strategies 8.4 Prudential Strategies with LP 8.5 Applications EXERCISES
Chapter 9 Evolutionary stable Strategies 9.1 Introduction Exercises Chapter
9 Chapter 10 Communications 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Game of Chicken
Without Communication 10.3 The Game of Chicken With Communication 10.3.1
Moving First or Committing to Move First 10.3.2 Issuing a Threat 10.3.3
Issuing a Promise 10.4 Credibility Classical Game Theory and the Missile
Crisis (from Brahm ,1994) Theory of Moves and the Missile Crisis Chapter 10
Exercises Chapter 11 Nash Arbitration Method 11.1 Introduction to Nash
Arbitration 11.2 Methods without calculus 11.3 More than two strategies
11.4 Writer's Guild Strike example with cardinal numbers Introduction Nash
Arbitration Scheme Chapter 12 Three Person Games 12.1 Three Person Zero-Sum
games 12.2 Three-Person Partial Conflict Game ( Non-Zero Sum Game). 12.4
NON-ZERO Sum (non-constant sum) with no pure strategies. 12.5 3-Person game
with Technology Chapter 13 Extensive Form Games 13.1 Introduction Example
1. Kidnapping for ransom Applying TOM
Chapter 1: Introduction to Decision Models 1.1 Overview of Decision Making
1.2 Decision Theory 1.3 Game Theory: Total Conflict Example 1.5: A Total
Conflict Game with Pure Strategies 1.4 Game Theory: Partial Conflict 1.5
Mathematical Modeling of Decisions 1.4 ILLUSTRATE EXAMPLES 1.5 Technology
Chapter 2 Decision Theory and Expected Value 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Expected
Value 2.3 Decisions Under Risk: Probabilities are known or estimated in
advance 2.4 Decisions under Uncertainty: Probabilities are not known nor
can they be estimated 2.5 Decision Trees 2.6 Sequential Decisions and
Conditional Probability (from Fox, Mathematical Modeling for Business
Analytics, Taylor and Francis, 2018) Chapter 3 Decisions under certainty:
Mathematical Programming Modeling: Linear, Integer, and Mixed Integer
Optimization 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Formulating Linear Programming Problems
3.3 Graphical Linear Programming 3.4 Linear Programming with Technology 3.5
Case Studies in Linear Programming Projects 3.5.1 Modeling of Ranking Units
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a LP 3.5.2 Recruiting Raleigh
Office (modified from McGrath, 2007) Chapter 4 Multi-Attribute Decision
Making using weighting schemes with SAW, AHP and TOPSIS 4.1 Weighting
Methods 4.1.1 Rank Order Centroid (ROC) 4.1.2 Ratio Method for Weights
4.1.3 Pairwise Comparison (AHP) 4.1.4 Entropy Method: 4.2 Simple Additive
Weights (SAW) Method 4.3 Weighted Product Method 4.4 Analytical Hierarchy
Process 4.5 Technique of Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal
Solution Methodology, Normalization, EXERCISES Chapter 4 CHAPTER 5 Game
Theory: Total Conflict 5.1 Introduction to Total Conflict Games 5.2 Models
with Pure Strategy Solutions 5.2.1 Movement Arrows with two players and a
payoff matrix: 5.2.2 Saddle Point Method 5.3 Dominance and Dominated
strategies Exercises Section 5.1 Pure Strategy Games 5.3 Mixed Strategy in
two player 2 strategy games 5.3 Linear Programming and Total Conflict Games
Chapter 6 Partial Conflict Games: The Classical Two-Player Games. Error!
Bookmark not defined. 6.1 Partial Conflict Simultaneous Games Introduction
6.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma 6.3 The Game of Chicken Chapter 7 Utility Theory
7.1 Introduction 7.2 Ordinal Numbers 7.3 Cardinal numbers 7.4 Utility 7.4
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities Applied to Game Theory. 7.5 An
alternative approach to the lottery method in utility theory for game
theory 7.5.1 Lottery Method Illustrated 7.5.2 AHP Method 7.5.3 AHP Example
in Game Theory 7.6 Summary and Conclusions Chapter 8. Nash Equilibrium and
Non-Cooperative Solutions in Partial Conflict Games 8.1 Introduction 8.2
Pure Strategies and Dominance review in symmetric games 8.3 Equalizing
Strategies 8.4 Prudential Strategies with LP 8.5 Applications EXERCISES
Chapter 9 Evolutionary stable Strategies 9.1 Introduction Exercises Chapter
9 Chapter 10 Communications 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Game of Chicken
Without Communication 10.3 The Game of Chicken With Communication 10.3.1
Moving First or Committing to Move First 10.3.2 Issuing a Threat 10.3.3
Issuing a Promise 10.4 Credibility Classical Game Theory and the Missile
Crisis (from Brahm ,1994) Theory of Moves and the Missile Crisis Chapter 10
Exercises Chapter 11 Nash Arbitration Method 11.1 Introduction to Nash
Arbitration 11.2 Methods without calculus 11.3 More than two strategies
11.4 Writer's Guild Strike example with cardinal numbers Introduction Nash
Arbitration Scheme Chapter 12 Three Person Games 12.1 Three Person Zero-Sum
games 12.2 Three-Person Partial Conflict Game ( Non-Zero Sum Game). 12.4
NON-ZERO Sum (non-constant sum) with no pure strategies. 12.5 3-Person game
with Technology Chapter 13 Extensive Form Games 13.1 Introduction Example
1. Kidnapping for ransom Applying TOM
1.2 Decision Theory 1.3 Game Theory: Total Conflict Example 1.5: A Total
Conflict Game with Pure Strategies 1.4 Game Theory: Partial Conflict 1.5
Mathematical Modeling of Decisions 1.4 ILLUSTRATE EXAMPLES 1.5 Technology
Chapter 2 Decision Theory and Expected Value 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Expected
Value 2.3 Decisions Under Risk: Probabilities are known or estimated in
advance 2.4 Decisions under Uncertainty: Probabilities are not known nor
can they be estimated 2.5 Decision Trees 2.6 Sequential Decisions and
Conditional Probability (from Fox, Mathematical Modeling for Business
Analytics, Taylor and Francis, 2018) Chapter 3 Decisions under certainty:
Mathematical Programming Modeling: Linear, Integer, and Mixed Integer
Optimization 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Formulating Linear Programming Problems
3.3 Graphical Linear Programming 3.4 Linear Programming with Technology 3.5
Case Studies in Linear Programming Projects 3.5.1 Modeling of Ranking Units
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a LP 3.5.2 Recruiting Raleigh
Office (modified from McGrath, 2007) Chapter 4 Multi-Attribute Decision
Making using weighting schemes with SAW, AHP and TOPSIS 4.1 Weighting
Methods 4.1.1 Rank Order Centroid (ROC) 4.1.2 Ratio Method for Weights
4.1.3 Pairwise Comparison (AHP) 4.1.4 Entropy Method: 4.2 Simple Additive
Weights (SAW) Method 4.3 Weighted Product Method 4.4 Analytical Hierarchy
Process 4.5 Technique of Order Preference by Similarity to the Ideal
Solution Methodology, Normalization, EXERCISES Chapter 4 CHAPTER 5 Game
Theory: Total Conflict 5.1 Introduction to Total Conflict Games 5.2 Models
with Pure Strategy Solutions 5.2.1 Movement Arrows with two players and a
payoff matrix: 5.2.2 Saddle Point Method 5.3 Dominance and Dominated
strategies Exercises Section 5.1 Pure Strategy Games 5.3 Mixed Strategy in
two player 2 strategy games 5.3 Linear Programming and Total Conflict Games
Chapter 6 Partial Conflict Games: The Classical Two-Player Games. Error!
Bookmark not defined. 6.1 Partial Conflict Simultaneous Games Introduction
6.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma 6.3 The Game of Chicken Chapter 7 Utility Theory
7.1 Introduction 7.2 Ordinal Numbers 7.3 Cardinal numbers 7.4 Utility 7.4
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utilities Applied to Game Theory. 7.5 An
alternative approach to the lottery method in utility theory for game
theory 7.5.1 Lottery Method Illustrated 7.5.2 AHP Method 7.5.3 AHP Example
in Game Theory 7.6 Summary and Conclusions Chapter 8. Nash Equilibrium and
Non-Cooperative Solutions in Partial Conflict Games 8.1 Introduction 8.2
Pure Strategies and Dominance review in symmetric games 8.3 Equalizing
Strategies 8.4 Prudential Strategies with LP 8.5 Applications EXERCISES
Chapter 9 Evolutionary stable Strategies 9.1 Introduction Exercises Chapter
9 Chapter 10 Communications 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Game of Chicken
Without Communication 10.3 The Game of Chicken With Communication 10.3.1
Moving First or Committing to Move First 10.3.2 Issuing a Threat 10.3.3
Issuing a Promise 10.4 Credibility Classical Game Theory and the Missile
Crisis (from Brahm ,1994) Theory of Moves and the Missile Crisis Chapter 10
Exercises Chapter 11 Nash Arbitration Method 11.1 Introduction to Nash
Arbitration 11.2 Methods without calculus 11.3 More than two strategies
11.4 Writer's Guild Strike example with cardinal numbers Introduction Nash
Arbitration Scheme Chapter 12 Three Person Games 12.1 Three Person Zero-Sum
games 12.2 Three-Person Partial Conflict Game ( Non-Zero Sum Game). 12.4
NON-ZERO Sum (non-constant sum) with no pure strategies. 12.5 3-Person game
with Technology Chapter 13 Extensive Form Games 13.1 Introduction Example
1. Kidnapping for ransom Applying TOM