Decision and Game Theory for Security

4th International Conference, GameSec 2013, Fort Worth, TX, USA, November 11-12, 2013, Proceedings
Herausgegeben:Das, Sajal K.; Nita-Rotaru, Cristina; Kantarcioglu, Murat

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2013, held in Fort Worth, TX, USA, in November 2013. The 15 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from numerous submissions. The conference focuses on analytical models based on game, information, communication, optimization, decision, and control theories that are applied to diverse security topics. At the same time, the connection between theoretical models and real world security problems are emphasized to establish the important feedback loop between theory and practice. Observing the scarcity of venues for researchers who try to develop a deeper theoretical understanding of the underlying incentive and resource allocation issues in security, we believe that GameSec will fill an important void and serve as a distinguished forum of highest standards for years to come.

Produktdetails

• Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8252
• Verlag: Springer / Springer International Publishing / Springer, Berlin
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 978-3-319-02785-2
• 2013
• Seitenzahl: 276
• Erscheinungstermin: 8. Oktober 2013
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 155mm x 16mm
• Gewicht: 448g
• ISBN-13: 9783319027852
• ISBN-10: 3319027859
• Artikelnr.: 39506607

Inhaltsangabe

On Communication over Gaussian Sensor Networks with Adversaries: Further Results.- A True Random Generator Using Human Gameplay.- A Game Theoretic Analysis of Collaboration in Wikipedia.- Controllability of Dynamical Systems: Threat Models and Reactive Security.- Adaptive Regret Minimization in Bounded-Memory Games.- The Cooperative Ballistic Missile Defence Game.- Security Games for Virtual Machine Allocation in Cloud Computing.- Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution against Boundedly Rational Followers.- Defeating Tyranny of the Masses in Crowdsourcing: Accounting for Low-Skilled and Adversarial Workers.- Quantifying Network Topology Robustness under Budget Constraints: General Model and Computational Complexity.- Mitigation of Targeted and Non-targeted Covert Attacks as a Timing Game.- New Efficient Utility Upper Bounds for the Fully Adaptive Model of Attack Trees.- Optimizing Active Cyber Defense.- Equilibrium Concepts for Rational Multiparty Computation.- Game-Theoretic Approach to Feedback-Driven Multi-stage Moving Target Defense.