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"This book addresses why, despite decades of attempted reform, the Pentagon continues to struggle to reduce waste and inefficiency. Peter Levine narrates the history of attempted reforms through three case studies in civilian personnel, acquisition, and financial management in the Department of Defense. The result is a clear understanding of what went wrong in the past and a set of concrete guidelines to plot a better future."--
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"This book addresses why, despite decades of attempted reform, the Pentagon continues to struggle to reduce waste and inefficiency. Peter Levine narrates the history of attempted reforms through three case studies in civilian personnel, acquisition, and financial management in the Department of Defense. The result is a clear understanding of what went wrong in the past and a set of concrete guidelines to plot a better future."--
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Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 352
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. März 2020
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 157mm x 28mm
- Gewicht: 680g
- ISBN-13: 9781503610460
- ISBN-10: 1503610462
- Artikelnr.: 57171057
- Verlag: Stanford University Press
- Seitenzahl: 352
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. März 2020
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 157mm x 28mm
- Gewicht: 680g
- ISBN-13: 9781503610460
- ISBN-10: 1503610462
- Artikelnr.: 57171057
Peter Levine is a senior fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses and a former Senate staffer. He has served as the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense-the senior Pentagon official responsible for defense management reform.
Contents and Abstracts
1Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of Defense
chapter abstract
The National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was initiated at a time of
consensus that the old civil service system was overly bureaucratic,
inflexible, and in need of reform. It received an unprecedented level of
resources, but still failed. The Bush administration helped strengthen
opposition by insisting on comprehensive changes to the collective
bargaining and employee appeals systems that were largely unrelated to the
reform's core purpose of linking pay to performance. The NSPS made changes
to parts of the system that needed to be changed, but it also changed parts
of the system that were working reasonably well. In the end, it failed
because of the controversy generated by parts of the new system that may
not have been necessary at all, and this failure dragged down the prospect
of constructive reform for at least another decade.
2Lessons from the Never-Ending Search for Acquisition Reform
chapter abstract
Over the last forty years, the DOD has undertaken at least five cycles of
acquisition reform, seeking at various times to centralize control over
major defense acquisition programs, to devolve more responsibility to the
military services, to reign in acquisition abuses with additional guidance,
and to rid the DOD and its contractors of excess regulations. While these
reforms were all driven by public outrage about cost growth and acquisition
abuses, they had wildly different results. The Packard Commission reforms
and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 were the most
successful of the reforms because they identified poor front-end decision
making as the most significant source of cost growth in the acquisition of
major weapon systems and developed a focused set of solutions for that
problem.
3Auditing the Pentagon
chapter abstract
Over the last three decades, the DOD has invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in planning activities, billions of dollars in efforts to compile
and reconcile financial data, and tens billions of dollars in new financial
systems, but has gotten no closer to an auditable financial statement. In
fact, an auditable financial statement provides little value for management
purposes and may not even be the right goal. The department's bookkeeping
problems are the result of a maze of deficient systems, poor controls,
dysfunctional processes, and stovepiped organizations, none of which can be
fixed by management fiat. The DOD has made the most progress in addressing
these problems when it has taken an incremental approach and settled for
improved systems and processes that were less than perfect for audit and
accounting purposes.
1Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of Defense
chapter abstract
The National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was initiated at a time of
consensus that the old civil service system was overly bureaucratic,
inflexible, and in need of reform. It received an unprecedented level of
resources, but still failed. The Bush administration helped strengthen
opposition by insisting on comprehensive changes to the collective
bargaining and employee appeals systems that were largely unrelated to the
reform's core purpose of linking pay to performance. The NSPS made changes
to parts of the system that needed to be changed, but it also changed parts
of the system that were working reasonably well. In the end, it failed
because of the controversy generated by parts of the new system that may
not have been necessary at all, and this failure dragged down the prospect
of constructive reform for at least another decade.
2Lessons from the Never-Ending Search for Acquisition Reform
chapter abstract
Over the last forty years, the DOD has undertaken at least five cycles of
acquisition reform, seeking at various times to centralize control over
major defense acquisition programs, to devolve more responsibility to the
military services, to reign in acquisition abuses with additional guidance,
and to rid the DOD and its contractors of excess regulations. While these
reforms were all driven by public outrage about cost growth and acquisition
abuses, they had wildly different results. The Packard Commission reforms
and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 were the most
successful of the reforms because they identified poor front-end decision
making as the most significant source of cost growth in the acquisition of
major weapon systems and developed a focused set of solutions for that
problem.
3Auditing the Pentagon
chapter abstract
Over the last three decades, the DOD has invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in planning activities, billions of dollars in efforts to compile
and reconcile financial data, and tens billions of dollars in new financial
systems, but has gotten no closer to an auditable financial statement. In
fact, an auditable financial statement provides little value for management
purposes and may not even be the right goal. The department's bookkeeping
problems are the result of a maze of deficient systems, poor controls,
dysfunctional processes, and stovepiped organizations, none of which can be
fixed by management fiat. The DOD has made the most progress in addressing
these problems when it has taken an incremental approach and settled for
improved systems and processes that were less than perfect for audit and
accounting purposes.
Contents and Abstracts
1Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of Defense
chapter abstract
The National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was initiated at a time of
consensus that the old civil service system was overly bureaucratic,
inflexible, and in need of reform. It received an unprecedented level of
resources, but still failed. The Bush administration helped strengthen
opposition by insisting on comprehensive changes to the collective
bargaining and employee appeals systems that were largely unrelated to the
reform's core purpose of linking pay to performance. The NSPS made changes
to parts of the system that needed to be changed, but it also changed parts
of the system that were working reasonably well. In the end, it failed
because of the controversy generated by parts of the new system that may
not have been necessary at all, and this failure dragged down the prospect
of constructive reform for at least another decade.
2Lessons from the Never-Ending Search for Acquisition Reform
chapter abstract
Over the last forty years, the DOD has undertaken at least five cycles of
acquisition reform, seeking at various times to centralize control over
major defense acquisition programs, to devolve more responsibility to the
military services, to reign in acquisition abuses with additional guidance,
and to rid the DOD and its contractors of excess regulations. While these
reforms were all driven by public outrage about cost growth and acquisition
abuses, they had wildly different results. The Packard Commission reforms
and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 were the most
successful of the reforms because they identified poor front-end decision
making as the most significant source of cost growth in the acquisition of
major weapon systems and developed a focused set of solutions for that
problem.
3Auditing the Pentagon
chapter abstract
Over the last three decades, the DOD has invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in planning activities, billions of dollars in efforts to compile
and reconcile financial data, and tens billions of dollars in new financial
systems, but has gotten no closer to an auditable financial statement. In
fact, an auditable financial statement provides little value for management
purposes and may not even be the right goal. The department's bookkeeping
problems are the result of a maze of deficient systems, poor controls,
dysfunctional processes, and stovepiped organizations, none of which can be
fixed by management fiat. The DOD has made the most progress in addressing
these problems when it has taken an incremental approach and settled for
improved systems and processes that were less than perfect for audit and
accounting purposes.
1Civilian Personnel Reform at the Department of Defense
chapter abstract
The National Security Personnel System (NSPS) was initiated at a time of
consensus that the old civil service system was overly bureaucratic,
inflexible, and in need of reform. It received an unprecedented level of
resources, but still failed. The Bush administration helped strengthen
opposition by insisting on comprehensive changes to the collective
bargaining and employee appeals systems that were largely unrelated to the
reform's core purpose of linking pay to performance. The NSPS made changes
to parts of the system that needed to be changed, but it also changed parts
of the system that were working reasonably well. In the end, it failed
because of the controversy generated by parts of the new system that may
not have been necessary at all, and this failure dragged down the prospect
of constructive reform for at least another decade.
2Lessons from the Never-Ending Search for Acquisition Reform
chapter abstract
Over the last forty years, the DOD has undertaken at least five cycles of
acquisition reform, seeking at various times to centralize control over
major defense acquisition programs, to devolve more responsibility to the
military services, to reign in acquisition abuses with additional guidance,
and to rid the DOD and its contractors of excess regulations. While these
reforms were all driven by public outrage about cost growth and acquisition
abuses, they had wildly different results. The Packard Commission reforms
and the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 were the most
successful of the reforms because they identified poor front-end decision
making as the most significant source of cost growth in the acquisition of
major weapon systems and developed a focused set of solutions for that
problem.
3Auditing the Pentagon
chapter abstract
Over the last three decades, the DOD has invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in planning activities, billions of dollars in efforts to compile
and reconcile financial data, and tens billions of dollars in new financial
systems, but has gotten no closer to an auditable financial statement. In
fact, an auditable financial statement provides little value for management
purposes and may not even be the right goal. The department's bookkeeping
problems are the result of a maze of deficient systems, poor controls,
dysfunctional processes, and stovepiped organizations, none of which can be
fixed by management fiat. The DOD has made the most progress in addressing
these problems when it has taken an incremental approach and settled for
improved systems and processes that were less than perfect for audit and
accounting purposes.