Defensive Federalism

Protecting Territorial Minorities from the "Tyranny of the Majority"
Herausgeber: Requejo, Ferran; Sanjaume-Calvet, Marc

• Broschiertes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Defensive Federalism presents an original contribution to the field of federalism and multinational democracies, exploring the concept of defensive federalism as a protection of self-government against the "tyranny of the majority".

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Produktdetails

• Routledge Studies in Federalism and Decentralization
• Verlag: Taylor & Francis Ltd
• Seitenzahl: 218
• Erscheinungstermin: 27. Mai 2024
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 12mm
• Gewicht: 340g
• ISBN-13: 9781032282770
• ISBN-10: 1032282770
• Artikelnr.: 70345915

Autorenporträt

Ferran Requejo is Professor of Political Science at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain, where he is Director of the Research Group on Political Theory. He has been Director of the Institute of Self- Government Studies, member of the Spanish Electoral Board and member of the Advisory Council for the National Transition. He has been awarded the Rudolf Wildenmann Prize (ECPR), the Ramon Trias Fargas Prize and the Spanish Political Science Association Prize for the best book ( Multinational Federalism and Value Pluralism, Routledge 2005). His main fields of research are theories of democracy, federalism, multinational democracies, political philosophy and liberalism after World War II. Marc Sanjaume- Calvet is Assistant Professor in Political Theory at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain. He is a former advisor and researcher at the Institute of Self- Government Studies. In 2015, he received the International Association of Centres of Federal Studies Young Researcher Award (IACFS). His main fields of research are federalism, theories of self- determination and secession, multinational democracies and political theory.

Inhaltsangabe

1. Defensive Federalism: Tackling the Two Faces of the Territorial Tyranny
of the Majority. A Revised Federal Institutional Design, 2. Consociational
Executives: Power-Sharing Governments Between Inclusion and Functionality?,
3. Exclusive Powers and Self-Governed Entities: A Tool for Defensive
Federalism?, 4. The Limits of Self Rule without Shared Rule, 5.
Constitutional Asymmetries as an (In)effective Counterbalancing Tool in
Protecting Territorial Self-Government?, 6. Political Asymmetries: 'Opting
In and Opting Out' Decision-Making Procedures in Canada, 7. Agreeing to
Disagree: Federal Veto Powers in Switzerland, 8. The Role of Constitutional
Judges in Protecting Territorial Self-Government, 9. The Defensiveness of
Nation-States: Preventing Majority Domination in the European Union, 10.
Federal Chiaroscuros: Concluding Remarks