Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.
Deflationist accounts of truth are widely held in contemporary philosophy: they seek to show that truth is a dispensable concept with no metaphysical depth. However, logical paradoxes present problems for deflationists, which their work has struggled to overcome. In this volume of fourteen original essays, a distinguished team of contributors explore the extent to which, if at all, deflationism can accommodate paradox. The volume will be of interest to philosophers of logic, philosophers of language, and anyone working on truth.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
JC Beall is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Connecticut. Bradley Armour-Garb is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Albany, SUNY
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * 1: JC Beall: Transparent disquotationalism * 2: Hartry Field: Is the Liar sentence both true and false? * 3: Graham Priest: Spiking the field artillery * 4: Hartry Field: Variations on a theme by Yablo * 5: Paul Horwich: A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth * 6: Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall: Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox * 7: Greg Restall: Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too * 8: Michael Glanzberg: Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes * 9: Anil Gupta: Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism? * 10: Christopher Gauker: Semantics for deflationists * 11: Dorothy Grover: How significant is the Liar? * 12: Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten: The deflationists' axioms for truth * 13: Alan Weir: Naive truth and sophisticated logic * 14: Jody Azzouni: Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes
* Introduction * 1: JC Beall: Transparent disquotationalism * 2: Hartry Field: Is the Liar sentence both true and false? * 3: Graham Priest: Spiking the field artillery * 4: Hartry Field: Variations on a theme by Yablo * 5: Paul Horwich: A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth * 6: Bradley Armour-Garb and JC Beall: Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox * 7: Greg Restall: Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too * 8: Michael Glanzberg: Minimalism, deflationism, and paradoxes * 9: Anil Gupta: Do the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationism? * 10: Christopher Gauker: Semantics for deflationists * 11: Dorothy Grover: How significant is the Liar? * 12: Volker Halbach and Leon Horsten: The deflationists' axioms for truth * 13: Alan Weir: Naive truth and sophisticated logic * 14: Jody Azzouni: Anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers and paradoxes
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