Winner of the CHOICE 1996 Outstanding Academic Book Award
Between 1928 and 1933, the victorious Great War allies Britain and France abdicated responsibility for shaping the postwar European order. This book is about the failure of their leadership. With the Locarno agreements in place, British leaders refused to take on security problems beyond Germany's western frontier. France sought to "organize" the peace through reconciliation with Germany and European integration, but its increasingly defensive military posture curtailed its ability to lead Europe. In effect having abandoned the structures created after the Great War to maintain the peace, the former allies after 1933 would respond to the initiatives of the dictators.
Between 1928 and 1933, the victorious Great War allies Britain and France abdicated responsibility for shaping the postwar European order. This book is about the failure of their leadership. With the Locarno agreements in place, British leaders refused to take on security problems beyond Germany's western frontier. France sought to "organize" the peace through reconciliation with Germany and European integration, but its increasingly defensive military posture curtailed its ability to lead Europe. In effect having abandoned the structures created after the Great War to maintain the peace, the former allies after 1933 would respond to the initiatives of the dictators.
"A pathbreaking examination of British and French views of the course of European diplomacy during the interwar period. With the end of the Cold War, its relevance to current problems has continually increased." (Diane B. Kunz, Yale University)
"Dr. Pereboom's book is an elegantly written study of the failure of leadership in Europe's two major democracies during the critical years when the precarious balance of post-World-War I Europe came under mortal threat from economic collapse and flagrant German revisionism." (Aviel Roshwald, Georgetown University)
"Dr. Pereboom's book is an elegantly written study of the failure of leadership in Europe's two major democracies during the critical years when the precarious balance of post-World-War I Europe came under mortal threat from economic collapse and flagrant German revisionism." (Aviel Roshwald, Georgetown University)