First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors' research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.
First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors' research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Patrick Dunleavy is Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and worked in the Department of Government at LSE from 1979 to 2020. He is also Emeritus Professor of Government at the University of Canberra, where he was Centenary Professor (2015-21). A Fellow of the British Academy and the Academy of Social Sciences, he also served as Founding Editor in Chief at LSE Press from 2020 to 2024. He was Director of the UK Democratic Audit from 2013-20. His recent books include The UK's Changing Democracy: the 2018 Democratic Audit (open access from LSE Press, 2018, co-edited); and Maximizing the Impacts of Academic Research (Palgrave, 2021, now Bloomsbury Press, co-authored with Jane Tinkler).
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis DEMOCRACY 2. Interest Groups and Collective Action 3. Reconstructing the Theory of Groups 4. Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour 5. Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model BUREAUCRACY 6. Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy 7. The Bureau-Shaping Model 8. Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models 9. Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
1. Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis DEMOCRACY 2. Interest Groups and Collective Action 3. Reconstructing the Theory of Groups 4. Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour 5. Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model BUREAUCRACY 6. Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy 7. The Bureau-Shaping Model 8. Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models 9. Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826