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Leading scholars from the United States and the European Union examine how democracies make foreign policy when their citizens disagree. The authors focus in particular on differences of opinion between the legislature and the executive - often called 'divided government' - and the constraints of public opinion on a leader's actions.
'The so-called Schelling conjecture, named after Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, is a key proposition in the applied bargaining literature. This 'paradox of weakness' suggests that the weak negotiator is often more successful than its resourceful and unconstrained counterpart. This volume explores in an exemplary fashion the relevance of the Schelling conjecture and some related hypotheses on how democracies negotiate with other states and how successful they are at the bargaining table. The theoretical and empirical work presented by this truly international research team offers new challenges and is presented with hallmark rigor and sophistication. Their collective tour de force will shape the negotiation and cooperation literature for years to come.' - Gerald Schneider, University of Konstanz, and Executive Editor European Union Politics