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![From "e;Defending Forward"e; To A "e;Global Defense-in-Depth"e;](https://bilder.buecher.de/produkte/41/41667/41667867m.jpg "From "e;Defending Forward"e; To A "e;Global Defense-in-Depth"e;")
This paper examines the contradiction between the use of depth as envisioned in U.S. Army doctrine and NATO's strategy of forward defense. The Eastern Front campaigns of World War II provide a relevant historical setting for the study of the relationship between strategy and operational depth. Hitler's aims and NATO's aims are totally different. His "stand fast" policy restricted the use of operational depth against the Soviets but it supported his strategy towards the end of the war. NATO's strategy supports deterrence but it does not adequately support the prosecution of war if deterrence fails. Doctrine supporting the use of operational level depth would support NATO's deterrence strategy as well as warfighting once deterrence fails. The mindset created by the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine will facilitate the use of depth within NATO's strategy.