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The precursor to this monograph "The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability" utilized three criteria: importance of advisory operations, frequency of advisory operations, and difficulty developing advisory capability to determine if the US Army needs and institutionalized advisory capability. Based on analysis of past advisory experiences, current US Army doctrine, and anticipated future requirements the study concluded that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential element of future operations and that advisory…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
The precursor to this monograph "The US Army and Security Force Assistance: Assessing the Need for an Institutionalized Advisory Capability" utilized three criteria: importance of advisory operations, frequency of advisory operations, and difficulty developing advisory capability to determine if the US Army needs and institutionalized advisory capability. Based on analysis of past advisory experiences, current US Army doctrine, and anticipated future requirements the study concluded that advisory operations will be a frequent and essential element of future operations and that advisory capabilities are difficult to develop when needed. Based on this conclusion the study determined that the US Army does require an institutionalized advisory capability. Based on this assessed need, the next step, and the purpose of this paper, is to answer the applied question of what characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability. This paper provides a review of the current discourse within the defense community concerning advisory requirements to help frame the problem and possible solution sets in order to identify key considerations for analysis. The study then utilizes the seven domains of DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities to determine capability requirements. The study bases the analysis of each domain on a wide range of considerations including doctrine, ongoing and past advisory experiences, US Army force management considerations, and input from the ongoing discourse within the defense community on stability and advisory operations. This study does not provide a specific force structure solution, but rather identifies the characteristics the US Army requires in an institutionalized advisory capability. The most significant domain in this analysis is the organizational domain. The tradeoffs required to create a large standing advisory capability are not acceptable in the context of the a