This study examines the efforts of the Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Navy, to develop an effective fire support coordination system for amphibious operations between the World Wars. The focus of the study is on both the intellectual and the practical efforts of the period. On the intellectual side the doctrinal manuals, professional journal articles, and lectures are examined. On the practical side the exercises conducted to experiment with the doctrine are examined. These facts are then analyzed to determine if an effective coordination system was developed. Additionally, the reasons for the status of this system at the start of the war are explored. The study concludes with an examination of the meaning these finding have for current doctrinal developers. The principal conclusion of the thesis is that an adequate coordination system for fire support in amphibious operations had not been developed prior to World War II. Although a basic system for requesting and adjusting fires had been devised, particularly for naval gunfire, there was no provision for the staff coordination of these fires. There was recognition of the problem in the period immediately prior to the World War II, but it was not acted upon until well into the war. Consequently, it took the crucible of war, with all its difficulties, to compel the completion of the system.
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