Paul Milgrom describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations. Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for solving complex resource allocation problems.
Paul Milgrom describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations. Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for solving complex resource allocation problems.
Paul Milgrom is the Shirley R. and Leonard W. Ely, Jr. Professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. He was awarded the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. His books include Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004) and Economics, Organization, and Management (1992). He has also written dozens of articles on auction design, game theory, and macro- and microeconomics.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface 1. Introduction 2. (Near-)Substitutes, Prices, and Stability 3. Vickrey Auctions and Substitution 4. Deferred-Acceptance Auctions and Near-Substitutes 5. Conclusion Notes References Index