Does the Perception of Casualties Affect Military Operations in the 1990s?
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This monograph analyzes three military operations Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo in order to determine if and how casualties impact the commitment or withdrawal of US forces in the 1990s. These operations are viewed from the positions of the National Command Authorities, Congress, American public, media, and the military and the linkage to include the impact they had on each other. The criteria are threat Casualty Analysis, impact of casualties on the will of the American public, and the impact of casualties on the NCA's decisions. This evidence was obtained from international newspapers. American...
This monograph analyzes three military operations Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo in order to determine if and how casualties impact the commitment or withdrawal of US forces in the 1990s. These operations are viewed from the positions of the National Command Authorities, Congress, American public, media, and the military and the linkage to include the impact they had on each other. The criteria are threat Casualty Analysis, impact of casualties on the will of the American public, and the impact of casualties on the NCA's decisions. This evidence was obtained from international newspapers. American newspapers also assisted with the analysis of what role the media plays in the process, along with the impact of the other forces that allow our military to commit, engage, and withdraw. Articles in newspapers such as the New York Times, Los Angeles Times and The Washington Post did shed light on the position of the NCA, US Congress, American people, media and the military. The congressional testimony of senior Army leaders along with books allowed the viewpoint of the military to surface to include guidance it received. This monograph demonstrates that casualties did not impact the commitment or withdrawal during military operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo. In the case of Somalia and Haiti, the NCA was concerned with the perception of the president as making decisions of his own free will and not being forced by Congress into a course of action. The American public along with Congress wanted to ensure the military objectives were nested to national interest. In the case of Kosovo, ground forces were not committed because NATO did not support the commitment versus President William Clinton's willingness to commit ground forces. The Secretary of Defense and some members of Congress along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not supportive of commitment of US ground forces. The most important lesson about casualties in the 1990s is that the operational comm
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