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The goal of this study is to highlight the impact of domestic politics on the bargaining process regarding the implementation of cross-border energy infrastructure projects. Adopting Putnam s two-level game model, this research examines the possibilities of altering the outcome of negotiations. Three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical framework on the validity of strategies employed by the political leaders. The results show that synergistic issue linkage is a fruitful strategy, while the issuing of threats must be backed by a stable domestic stance. The right of veto to initiate the…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
The goal of this study is to highlight the impact of domestic politics on the bargaining process regarding the implementation of cross-border energy infrastructure projects. Adopting Putnam s two-level game model, this research examines the possibilities of altering the outcome of negotiations. Three hypotheses are derived from the theoretical framework on the validity of strategies employed by the political leaders. The results show that synergistic issue linkage is a fruitful strategy, while the issuing of threats must be backed by a stable domestic stance. The right of veto to initiate the negotiation is effective as well, but only at the initial stages of cooperation.
Autorenporträt
Toma Mikalauskait was born in 1983 in Lithuania. She was awarded a Bachelor in Political Sciences degree from Vilnius University, Lithuania in 2008. Additionally she was awarded a Master in Political Science with a specialization in International and European Relations degree from Linköping University, Sweden in 2011.