Explains why the politics of Japan is dominated by a single party: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Amy Catalinac offers a new theory for how politicians competing under a particular set of institutions can cultivate clientelistic relationships with groups of voters, in which money is exchanged for votes.
Explains why the politics of Japan is dominated by a single party: the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Amy Catalinac offers a new theory for how politicians competing under a particular set of institutions can cultivate clientelistic relationships with groups of voters, in which money is exchanged for votes.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Amy Catalinac is an associate professor of Politics at New York University. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University, where she is also a faculty associate at the Program on US-Japan Relations. Amy has held appointments at Princeton University, Harvard University, and Australian National University. She is an editor at the Journal of Politics, the author of Electoral Reform and National Security in Japan: From Pork to Foreign Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2016) and has published articles in American Political Science Review, World Politics, Journal of Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Electoral Studies, and other journals. She is the recipient of prizes awarded by the American Political Science Association and Midwest Political Science Association. Amy is a co-founder and organizer of the Japanese Politics Online Seminar Series.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction 2. The enduring success of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party 3. A theory of group-based clientelism 4. Second prize is a set of steak knives 5. Perfect storm conditions for tournaments in Japan 6. How politicians tie money to electoral support 7. Which electoral districts get more money and why 8. How tournaments impact decisions to vote 9. Conclusion 10. Appendix Bibliography.
1. Introduction 2. The enduring success of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party 3. A theory of group-based clientelism 4. Second prize is a set of steak knives 5. Perfect storm conditions for tournaments in Japan 6. How politicians tie money to electoral support 7. Which electoral districts get more money and why 8. How tournaments impact decisions to vote 9. Conclusion 10. Appendix Bibliography.
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