Daniel M Smith

Dynasties and Democracy

The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Daniel M. Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Stanford University Press
• Seitenzahl: 384
• Erscheinungstermin: 3. Juli 2018
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 231mm x 155mm x 30mm
• Gewicht: 726g
• ISBN-13: 9781503605053
• ISBN-10: 1503605051
• Artikelnr.: 49385111

Autorenporträt

Daniel M. Smith is Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Harvard University.

Inhaltsangabe

Contents and Abstracts
1Introduction: Dynasties in Democracies
chapter abstract
This chapter introduces the puzzle of "democratic dynasties" and Japan's
unusually high level of dynastic politics compared to other democracies.
The chapter briefly reviews the existing explanations for the causes of
dynastic politics, and then summarizes the new theoretical argument that is
offered in the book, as well as the background context of the case of Japan
and the research design used to test the argument. Finally, the chapter
discusses the potential positive and negative consequences of democratic
dynasties and provides an outline of the book's remaining chapters.
2Putting Japan into Comparative Perspective
chapter abstract
This chapter gives a descriptive overview of the empirical record using the
book's two original data sets. The first aim is to situate the case of
Japan in a broader comparative context and highlight some of the puzzles in
the aggregate variation in dynastic politics across countries, parties, and
time. The second aim is to explore the empirical patterns in Japan in order
to establish that these patterns provide insufficient insight into the
sources of Japan's high level of dynastic politics. There are few
differences between legacy candidates and non-legacy candidates in terms of
personal characteristics, experience, education, or background-apart from
their legacy ties-which might explain their greater electoral success. The
third aim is to demonstrate that alternative theories based on history or
culture do not provide credible explanations for the empirical differences
between Japan and other democracies.
3A Comparative Theory of Dynastic Candidate Selection
chapter abstract
This chapter introduces a comparative theory of dynastic candidate
selection based on a framework of supply and demand within the
institutional contexts of electoral systems and candidate selection
methods. On the supply side, incumbents who serve longer terms in office,
and who are themselves part of an existing dynasty, will be more likely to
have family members who select into politics. However, relative demand for
their potential successors will be higher where electoral institutions
generate candidate-centered elections, and in parties where candidate
selection processes are exclusive and decentralized, leaving much of the
decision up to local party actors-in Japan's case, primarily the support
groups of exiting candidates. Demand for legacy candidates should also be
higher in parties with weak organizational linkages to groups in civil
society and when the previous incumbent dies in office. Comparative
evidence is presented in support of the theory.
4Selection: From Family Business to Party Priority
chapter abstract
This chapter examines dynastic candidate selection in Japan under the
single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral system and the changes that
have occurred since the adoption of a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM)
system, which combines first-past-the-post and closed-list proportional
representation. Dynasties under SNTV were more common in larger,
decentralized parties-especially the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The
MMM system shifted the focus of elections from candidates to parties.
Subsequent party reforms within the LDP have expanded the pool of
candidates and placed greater control over nominations with national-level
party leaders, who have selected a more diverse range of candidates. Legacy
candidates are still nominated, but recently, only the most powerful and
longest-serving incumbents are likely to be succeeded in politics by a
family member. This suggests that demand-side incentives have changed,
leaving mainly supply-side incentives to explain the continued persistence
of dynastic politics.
5Election: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage
chapter abstract
This chapter explores the inherited incumbency advantage in elections, the
mechanisms behind the advantage, and how it differs in the prereform and
postreform electoral environments of Japan. New legacy candidates are
decidedly advantaged over non-legacy candidates in both SNTV and FPTP
elections. However, there is also a selection effect in terms of where
legacy candidates emerge. In the prereform period, legacy candidates
followed strong incumbents, whose exit freed up votes and encouraged the
entry of competitive challengers. In the postreform period, legacy
candidates are most likely to get nominated in party strongholds where any
new candidate might be similarly successful, and challengers tend to be
weaker. Evidence from traditional surveys and a conjoint survey experiment
suggests that voters in Japan do not like the idea of dynasties in the
abstract sense, even as they continue to elect specific legacy candidates
in their own local districts.
6Promotion: Dynastic Dominance in the Cabinet
chapter abstract
This chapter evaluates the advantage of dynastic ties in promotion to
cabinet. Before 1970, legacy members of parliament-particularly those whose
predecessors had served in cabinet-were overrepresented in most
cabinets. From 1970 to 1993, seniority rule and factional balancing
functioned as informal institutions constraining the choices of LDP prime
ministers, and legacy MPs enjoyed no apparent advantage. In the years since
electoral reform, legacy MPs are again dramatically overrepresented in LDP
cabinets. For those whose predecessors never served in cabinet, this
advantage is due in large part to seniority. Legacy MPs with a family
history in the cabinet, conversely, enjoy a significant advantage in
promotion that cannot be explained simply by seniority. It is likely that
the relatives of former cabinet ministers benefit from internal party
networks or other informational advantages within the party. The advantage
of cabinet legacies is evident in several of the comparative country cases.
7The Consequences of Dynastic Politics for Representation
chapter abstract
This chapter considers several potential downstream effects of dynastic
politics on the functioning of democracy and the quality of representation,
including effects on gender representation, the representational style of
candidates, and legislative behavior. There is a clear pattern across
democracies and in Japan of a gender bias in dynastic politics. However,
this bias tends to decrease over time. An analysis of the policy content of
candidate manifestos suggests that dynasties provide some continuity in
representation for voters, which may be part of their appeal. There is less
evidence that legacy MPs are any more active in the legislature than
non-legacy MPs. Although cabinet legacies tend to speak more in plenary
sessions of the Diet since electoral reform, there are no other obvious
differences in the legislative activity of legacy and non-legacy MPs.
8Conclusion: Family Fiefdoms and Party Politics
chapter abstract
This chapter concludes the book by drawing together the key empirical
findings and reflecting on the lessons that Japan's experience with
dynastic politics might hold for other democracies, such as India and the
Philippines, where dynasties have been viewed as a growing problem in
recent years, and Ireland, where politics is still in many ways a family
affair. The key challenge is how to transform party organizations from
decentralized cadres of local notables into coherent vehicles for
programmatic policies. The experience of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party,
viewed through the lens of dynastic politics, sheds important light on the
possibilities and challenges involved in institutional design and reform.