The book concentrates on macroeconomic policies from
both economic and political economy
perspective. The first two chapters take a pure
economic perspective and analyze foreign exchange
interventions pursued by the Czech National Bank in
the 2001-2002 appreciation bubble period. Third
chapter reviews the literature on dynamic
inconsistency of monetary policy and discusses
alternative proposals to limit the incentives of
policymakers to use monetary policy to maximize
their political support function. Fourth chapter
empirically measures the political pressure on the
Czech central bank and tests whether such pressure
influences monetary policy. Fifth chapter discusses
the concept of central bank independence from the
constitutional economics perspective. Finally, sixth
chapter uses a dynamic inconsistency model to assess
three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal
constitution in order to limit government s
incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing
political support.
both economic and political economy
perspective. The first two chapters take a pure
economic perspective and analyze foreign exchange
interventions pursued by the Czech National Bank in
the 2001-2002 appreciation bubble period. Third
chapter reviews the literature on dynamic
inconsistency of monetary policy and discusses
alternative proposals to limit the incentives of
policymakers to use monetary policy to maximize
their political support function. Fourth chapter
empirically measures the political pressure on the
Czech central bank and tests whether such pressure
influences monetary policy. Fifth chapter discusses
the concept of central bank independence from the
constitutional economics perspective. Finally, sixth
chapter uses a dynamic inconsistency model to assess
three alternative proposals how to reform fiscal
constitution in order to limit government s
incentive to use fiscal policy for maximizing
political support.