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A study of pollution reform that considers how the use of transferable permits to control pollution has evolved, looks at how these programs have been implemented in the US and internationally, and offers an objective evaluation of the resulting successes, failures, and lessons learned over the last twenty-five years.
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A study of pollution reform that considers how the use of transferable permits to control pollution has evolved, looks at how these programs have been implemented in the US and internationally, and offers an objective evaluation of the resulting successes, failures, and lessons learned over the last twenty-five years.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Inc
- 2 ed
- Seitenzahl: 248
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. März 2006
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 14mm
- Gewicht: 352g
- ISBN-13: 9781933115313
- ISBN-10: 1933115319
- Artikelnr.: 21722685
- Verlag: Taylor & Francis Inc
- 2 ed
- Seitenzahl: 248
- Erscheinungstermin: 10. März 2006
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 229mm x 152mm x 14mm
- Gewicht: 352g
- ISBN-13: 9781933115313
- ISBN-10: 1933115319
- Artikelnr.: 21722685
T. H. Tietenberg is the Mitchell Family Professor of Economics at Colby College in Waterville, Maine and the author or editor of eleven books, including Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, one of the best-selling textbooks in the field. He has consulted on environmental policy with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Development, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, as well as several state and foreign governments.
Figures and Tables
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
Describing the Evolution
The Evolution of Emissions Trading
The Evolution of Design Features
An Overview of the Book
The Conceptual Framework
The Regulatory Dilemma
The Cost-Effectiveness Framework
Cost-Effective Permit Markets
The Role of Transactions Costs
The Role of Administrative Costs
The Role of Technical Change
Summary
The Consequences of Emissions Trading
The Nature of the Evidence
Ex Ante Evaluations: The Evidence
Ex Post Evaluations: The Evidence
Summary
The Spatial Dimension
Difficulties in Implementing an Ambient Permit System
Possible Alternatives
Summary
The Temporal Dimension
Borrowing, Banking, and the Nature of the Environmental Target
Linking Emissions and Pollutant Concentrations
The Role of Banking and Borrowing
Strategies for Controlling Seasonal or Episodic Peaks
Summary
The Initial Allocation
Initial Allocation Approaches
Comparing the Allocation Approaches
Cost-Effectiveness Implications of the Initial Allocation
Summary
Market Power
Permit Price Manipulation: Conceptual Models
Leveraging Power Between Output and Permit Markets
Ex Ante Simulations
Results from Experimental Studies
Mechanisms for Controlling Market Power
Programmatic Design Features That Affect Market Power
Summary
Monitoring and Enforcement
The Nature of the Domestic Enforcement Process
The Nature of the International Enforcement Process
The Economics of Enforcement
Current Enforcement Practice
Summary
Lessons
Lessons About Program Effectiveness
Lessons About Instrument Choice and Program Design
Concluding Comments
References
Index
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
Describing the Evolution
The Evolution of Emissions Trading
The Evolution of Design Features
An Overview of the Book
The Conceptual Framework
The Regulatory Dilemma
The Cost-Effectiveness Framework
Cost-Effective Permit Markets
The Role of Transactions Costs
The Role of Administrative Costs
The Role of Technical Change
Summary
The Consequences of Emissions Trading
The Nature of the Evidence
Ex Ante Evaluations: The Evidence
Ex Post Evaluations: The Evidence
Summary
The Spatial Dimension
Difficulties in Implementing an Ambient Permit System
Possible Alternatives
Summary
The Temporal Dimension
Borrowing, Banking, and the Nature of the Environmental Target
Linking Emissions and Pollutant Concentrations
The Role of Banking and Borrowing
Strategies for Controlling Seasonal or Episodic Peaks
Summary
The Initial Allocation
Initial Allocation Approaches
Comparing the Allocation Approaches
Cost-Effectiveness Implications of the Initial Allocation
Summary
Market Power
Permit Price Manipulation: Conceptual Models
Leveraging Power Between Output and Permit Markets
Ex Ante Simulations
Results from Experimental Studies
Mechanisms for Controlling Market Power
Programmatic Design Features That Affect Market Power
Summary
Monitoring and Enforcement
The Nature of the Domestic Enforcement Process
The Nature of the International Enforcement Process
The Economics of Enforcement
Current Enforcement Practice
Summary
Lessons
Lessons About Program Effectiveness
Lessons About Instrument Choice and Program Design
Concluding Comments
References
Index
Figures and Tables
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
Describing the Evolution
The Evolution of Emissions Trading
The Evolution of Design Features
An Overview of the Book
The Conceptual Framework
The Regulatory Dilemma
The Cost-Effectiveness Framework
Cost-Effective Permit Markets
The Role of Transactions Costs
The Role of Administrative Costs
The Role of Technical Change
Summary
The Consequences of Emissions Trading
The Nature of the Evidence
Ex Ante Evaluations: The Evidence
Ex Post Evaluations: The Evidence
Summary
The Spatial Dimension
Difficulties in Implementing an Ambient Permit System
Possible Alternatives
Summary
The Temporal Dimension
Borrowing, Banking, and the Nature of the Environmental Target
Linking Emissions and Pollutant Concentrations
The Role of Banking and Borrowing
Strategies for Controlling Seasonal or Episodic Peaks
Summary
The Initial Allocation
Initial Allocation Approaches
Comparing the Allocation Approaches
Cost-Effectiveness Implications of the Initial Allocation
Summary
Market Power
Permit Price Manipulation: Conceptual Models
Leveraging Power Between Output and Permit Markets
Ex Ante Simulations
Results from Experimental Studies
Mechanisms for Controlling Market Power
Programmatic Design Features That Affect Market Power
Summary
Monitoring and Enforcement
The Nature of the Domestic Enforcement Process
The Nature of the International Enforcement Process
The Economics of Enforcement
Current Enforcement Practice
Summary
Lessons
Lessons About Program Effectiveness
Lessons About Instrument Choice and Program Design
Concluding Comments
References
Index
Preface
Abbreviations
Introduction
Describing the Evolution
The Evolution of Emissions Trading
The Evolution of Design Features
An Overview of the Book
The Conceptual Framework
The Regulatory Dilemma
The Cost-Effectiveness Framework
Cost-Effective Permit Markets
The Role of Transactions Costs
The Role of Administrative Costs
The Role of Technical Change
Summary
The Consequences of Emissions Trading
The Nature of the Evidence
Ex Ante Evaluations: The Evidence
Ex Post Evaluations: The Evidence
Summary
The Spatial Dimension
Difficulties in Implementing an Ambient Permit System
Possible Alternatives
Summary
The Temporal Dimension
Borrowing, Banking, and the Nature of the Environmental Target
Linking Emissions and Pollutant Concentrations
The Role of Banking and Borrowing
Strategies for Controlling Seasonal or Episodic Peaks
Summary
The Initial Allocation
Initial Allocation Approaches
Comparing the Allocation Approaches
Cost-Effectiveness Implications of the Initial Allocation
Summary
Market Power
Permit Price Manipulation: Conceptual Models
Leveraging Power Between Output and Permit Markets
Ex Ante Simulations
Results from Experimental Studies
Mechanisms for Controlling Market Power
Programmatic Design Features That Affect Market Power
Summary
Monitoring and Enforcement
The Nature of the Domestic Enforcement Process
The Nature of the International Enforcement Process
The Economics of Enforcement
Current Enforcement Practice
Summary
Lessons
Lessons About Program Effectiveness
Lessons About Instrument Choice and Program Design
Concluding Comments
References
Index