In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
Patricia S. Greenspan writes on topics in philosophical psychology and ethics.
Inhaltsangabe
Part 1: Emotions as 'Extrajudgemental' Evaluations. 1. Reasons to Feel: Sketch of an Argument 2. Emotions without Essences: Varieties of Fear 3. Some Morally Significant Emotions: Rewards and Punishments 4. Perceptual Warrant: Suspicion Revisted 5. Rationally Appropriate Ambivalence: Contrary Emotions 6. Justifying Emotion: What One Ought to Feel
Part 1: Emotions as 'Extrajudgemental' Evaluations. 1. Reasons to Feel: Sketch of an Argument 2. Emotions without Essences: Varieties of Fear 3. Some Morally Significant Emotions: Rewards and Punishments 4. Perceptual Warrant: Suspicion Revisted 5. Rationally Appropriate Ambivalence: Contrary Emotions 6. Justifying Emotion: What One Ought to Feel
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