60,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandkostenfrei*
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
payback
30 °P sammeln
  • Broschiertes Buch

Increases in the range and lethality of combat firepower forced units to disperse for survival and resulted in a corresponding increase in the size of the battlefield. The emergence of the operational level of war, which produced a three-fold rather than a two-fold paradigm of military art, was a consequence of attempts to exercise authority over combat forces in the ever-growing battlespace. Practitioners of the military art have often relied upon information technology (IT), to exercise command-and-control-"the expression of the commander's will and intent." This thesis investigates the…mehr

Produktbeschreibung
Increases in the range and lethality of combat firepower forced units to disperse for survival and resulted in a corresponding increase in the size of the battlefield. The emergence of the operational level of war, which produced a three-fold rather than a two-fold paradigm of military art, was a consequence of attempts to exercise authority over combat forces in the ever-growing battlespace. Practitioners of the military art have often relied upon information technology (IT), to exercise command-and-control-"the expression of the commander's will and intent." This thesis investigates the unique aspects of airpower command-and-control to determine how the information atmosphere-the habits of people and the capabilities of technology-has affected the relationships among the levels of war. The scope of this study places primary emphasis on the IT aspects of the information atmosphere in the command-and-control of airpower. In particular, the relationships among the levels of war are examined by assessing the strategic-operational level interface and the operational-tactical interface. Drawing on evidence from the application of airpower in Vietnam, Operation DESERT STORM, and Operation DELIBERATE FORCE this study concludes that the command-and-control process is determined more by the personalities of the leaders involved than by the available technology. Information technology has had little effect on the strategic-operational interface.