This book examines environmental policy-making through research into individuals' reaction to environmental issues. It is often assumed that people are reluctant to contribute to environmental protection, because they do not see it as in their interests. The authors argue that self-interest is just one of a number of motives which affect people's choices, and that voluntary environmental polices are thus more likely to succeed than might be expected. They base their arguments on detailed surveys of public opinion.
This book examines environmental policy-making through research into individuals' reaction to environmental issues. It is often assumed that people are reluctant to contribute to environmental protection, because they do not see it as in their interests. The authors argue that self-interest is just one of a number of motives which affect people's choices, and that voluntary environmental polices are thus more likely to succeed than might be expected. They base their arguments on detailed surveys of public opinion.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Dr Huib Pellikaan is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Leiden University. He is currently the managing editor of Acta Politica, the journal of the Dutch Association for the Science of Politics.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actor's perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actor's perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.
Preface Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action 1.1. Can something be done? 1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action 1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice 1.4. How motives speak to preferences 1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour 1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands 1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional? 1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design 2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept 2.1. Introduction 2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation 2.3. The social instruments 2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma 2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based? 3. The actor's perspective on collective action 3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory 3.2. Problems of collective action 3.3. Social dilemmas 3.4. The actor's perspective Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement 4.1. Three potential social dilemmas 4.2. Measuring preference orderings 4.3. Three different environmental problems 4.4. Avoiding response effects 5. Rational choice 5.1. Conditions of rational choice 5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice 5.3. Choice of strategy 5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule 5.5. Conclusion 6. Consistency of motives and preferences 6.1. A model of reasoned choice 6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness 6.3. The test of consistent preferences 6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases 6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter? 6.6. Conclusion 7. The non-equivalence of the cases 7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma 7.2. The model of the hardest case 7.3. The scalability of the cases 7.4. Conclusion 8. Reported behaviour 8.1. Determinants of behaviour 8.2. The sociocultural model 8.3. An alternative model 8.4. From motives to behaviour Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy? 9.1. Introduction to Part III 9.2. Acceptance and agreement 9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation 9.4. Conclusion 10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos? 10.1. Introduction 10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos 10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights? 10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences 10.5. The agreement response 10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview 11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation 11.1. Ranking preference orderings 11.2. The meta-ranking approach 11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment 11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking 11.5. An environmental meta-ranking 12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas 12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation 12.2. The reciprocity thesis 12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas 13. Assessing self regulation policies 13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas 13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation 13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases 13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos 13.5. Individual cost and collective gain 13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases 13.7. The dimension of private significance 13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real? 13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility 13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation Bibliography Index.
Es gelten unsere Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen: www.buecher.de/agb
Impressum
www.buecher.de ist ein Internetauftritt der buecher.de internetstores GmbH
Geschäftsführung: Monica Sawhney | Roland Kölbl | Günter Hilger
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Batheyer Straße 115 - 117, 58099 Hagen
Postanschrift: Bürgermeister-Wegele-Str. 12, 86167 Augsburg
Amtsgericht Hagen HRB 13257
Steuernummer: 321/5800/1497
USt-IdNr: DE450055826
