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The authors argue that citizens are willing and able to contribute towards environmental protection.
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The authors argue that citizens are willing and able to contribute towards environmental protection.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 262
- Erscheinungstermin: 2. April 2015
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 581g
- ISBN-13: 9780521621564
- ISBN-10: 0521621569
- Artikelnr.: 26939670
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 262
- Erscheinungstermin: 2. April 2015
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 20mm
- Gewicht: 581g
- ISBN-13: 9780521621564
- ISBN-10: 0521621569
- Artikelnr.: 26939670
Dr Huib Pellikaan is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Leiden University. He is currently the managing editor of Acta Politica, the journal of the Dutch Association for the Science of Politics.
Preface
Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action
1.1. Can something be done?
1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action
1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice
1.4. How motives speak to preferences
1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour
1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands
1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional?
1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design
2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation
2.3. The social instruments
2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma
2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based?
3. The actor's perspective on collective action
3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory
3.2. Problems of collective action
3.3. Social dilemmas
3.4. The actor's perspective
Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement
4.1. Three potential social dilemmas
4.2. Measuring preference orderings
4.3. Three different environmental problems
4.4. Avoiding response effects
5. Rational choice
5.1. Conditions of rational choice
5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice
5.3. Choice of strategy
5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule
5.5. Conclusion
6. Consistency of motives and preferences
6.1. A model of reasoned choice
6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness
6.3. The test of consistent preferences
6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases
6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter?
6.6. Conclusion
7. The non-equivalence of the cases
7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma
7.2. The model of the hardest case
7.3. The scalability of the cases
7.4. Conclusion
8. Reported behaviour
8.1. Determinants of behaviour
8.2. The sociocultural model
8.3. An alternative model
8.4. From motives to behaviour
Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy?
9.1. Introduction to Part III
9.2. Acceptance and agreement
9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation
9.4. Conclusion
10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos?
10.1. Introduction
10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos
10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights?
10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences
10.5. The agreement response
10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview
11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation
11.1. Ranking preference orderings
11.2. The meta-ranking approach
11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment
11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking
11.5. An environmental meta-ranking
12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas
12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation
12.2. The reciprocity thesis
12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas
13. Assessing self regulation policies
13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas
13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation
13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases
13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos
13.5. Individual cost and collective gain
13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases
13.7. The dimension of private significance
13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real?
13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility
13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation
Bibliography
Index.
Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action
1.1. Can something be done?
1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action
1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice
1.4. How motives speak to preferences
1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour
1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands
1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional?
1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design
2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation
2.3. The social instruments
2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma
2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based?
3. The actor's perspective on collective action
3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory
3.2. Problems of collective action
3.3. Social dilemmas
3.4. The actor's perspective
Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement
4.1. Three potential social dilemmas
4.2. Measuring preference orderings
4.3. Three different environmental problems
4.4. Avoiding response effects
5. Rational choice
5.1. Conditions of rational choice
5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice
5.3. Choice of strategy
5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule
5.5. Conclusion
6. Consistency of motives and preferences
6.1. A model of reasoned choice
6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness
6.3. The test of consistent preferences
6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases
6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter?
6.6. Conclusion
7. The non-equivalence of the cases
7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma
7.2. The model of the hardest case
7.3. The scalability of the cases
7.4. Conclusion
8. Reported behaviour
8.1. Determinants of behaviour
8.2. The sociocultural model
8.3. An alternative model
8.4. From motives to behaviour
Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy?
9.1. Introduction to Part III
9.2. Acceptance and agreement
9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation
9.4. Conclusion
10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos?
10.1. Introduction
10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos
10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights?
10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences
10.5. The agreement response
10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview
11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation
11.1. Ranking preference orderings
11.2. The meta-ranking approach
11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment
11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking
11.5. An environmental meta-ranking
12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas
12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation
12.2. The reciprocity thesis
12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas
13. Assessing self regulation policies
13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas
13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation
13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases
13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos
13.5. Individual cost and collective gain
13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases
13.7. The dimension of private significance
13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real?
13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility
13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation
Bibliography
Index.
Preface
Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action
1.1. Can something be done?
1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action
1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice
1.4. How motives speak to preferences
1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour
1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands
1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional?
1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design
2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation
2.3. The social instruments
2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma
2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based?
3. The actor's perspective on collective action
3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory
3.2. Problems of collective action
3.3. Social dilemmas
3.4. The actor's perspective
Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement
4.1. Three potential social dilemmas
4.2. Measuring preference orderings
4.3. Three different environmental problems
4.4. Avoiding response effects
5. Rational choice
5.1. Conditions of rational choice
5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice
5.3. Choice of strategy
5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule
5.5. Conclusion
6. Consistency of motives and preferences
6.1. A model of reasoned choice
6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness
6.3. The test of consistent preferences
6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases
6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter?
6.6. Conclusion
7. The non-equivalence of the cases
7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma
7.2. The model of the hardest case
7.3. The scalability of the cases
7.4. Conclusion
8. Reported behaviour
8.1. Determinants of behaviour
8.2. The sociocultural model
8.3. An alternative model
8.4. From motives to behaviour
Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy?
9.1. Introduction to Part III
9.2. Acceptance and agreement
9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation
9.4. Conclusion
10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos?
10.1. Introduction
10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos
10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights?
10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences
10.5. The agreement response
10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview
11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation
11.1. Ranking preference orderings
11.2. The meta-ranking approach
11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment
11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking
11.5. An environmental meta-ranking
12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas
12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation
12.2. The reciprocity thesis
12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas
13. Assessing self regulation policies
13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas
13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation
13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases
13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos
13.5. Individual cost and collective gain
13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases
13.7. The dimension of private significance
13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real?
13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility
13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation
Bibliography
Index.
Part I. Background: 1. Environmental pollution as a problem of collective action
1.1. Can something be done?
1.2. Environmental dilemmas and the logic of collective action
1.3. Surveying environmental dilemmas from the actor's perspective: rational choice
1.4. How motives speak to preferences
1.5. Non-equivalent dilemmas and reported behaviour
1.6. Policies of self regulation in the Netherlands
1.7. Moral commitment in environmental dilemmas: conditional or unconditional?
1.8. Determinants of cooperation in environmental dilemmas and policy design
2. A Dutch approach: self regulation as a policy concept
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Dutch environmental policy and the idea of self regulation
2.3. The social instruments
2.4. An environmental ethos and the social dilemma
2.5. Self regulation: compliance-oriented or virtue-based?
3. The actor's perspective on collective action
3.1. The subjectivity of the actor in rational choice theory
3.2. Problems of collective action
3.3. Social dilemmas
3.4. The actor's perspective
Part II. The Survey: 4. Preference orderings and measurement
4.1. Three potential social dilemmas
4.2. Measuring preference orderings
4.3. Three different environmental problems
4.4. Avoiding response effects
5. Rational choice
5.1. Conditions of rational choice
5.2. The dominance rule of rational choice
5.3. Choice of strategy
5.4. The robustness of the dominance rule
5.5. Conclusion
6. Consistency of motives and preferences
6.1. A model of reasoned choice
6.2. The motives of Valuation and Willingness
6.3. The test of consistent preferences
6.4. Consistent preferences in the three cases
6.5. Does motive-preference consistency matter?
6.6. Conclusion
7. The non-equivalence of the cases
7.1. Hard and easy cases of the dilemma
7.2. The model of the hardest case
7.3. The scalability of the cases
7.4. Conclusion
8. Reported behaviour
8.1. Determinants of behaviour
8.2. The sociocultural model
8.3. An alternative model
8.4. From motives to behaviour
Part III. Conclusions: Theory and Policy: 9. Do people accept self regulation policy?
9.1. Introduction to Part III
9.2. Acceptance and agreement
9.3. The acceptance of legal regulation and self regulation
9.4. Conclusion
10. Do people agree with the environmental ethos?
10.1. Introduction
10.2. The two stages of the environmental ethos
10.3. Knaves, pawns or knights?
10.4. The ethical interpretation of motives and preferences
10.5. The agreement response
10.6. Acceptance and agreement: overview
11. Moral commitment and rational cooperation
11.1. Ranking preference orderings
11.2. The meta-ranking approach
11.3. Enlightened self-interest and moral commitment
11.4. Consistent preferences in the meta-ranking
11.5. An environmental meta-ranking
12. Reciprocity and cooperation in environmental dilemmas
12.1. The puzzle of unconditional cooperation
12.2. The reciprocity thesis
12.3. Cost of cooperation and conditionalities in environmental dilemmas
13. Assessing self regulation policies
13.1. The context of environmental dilemmas
13.2. Consistent ethical cooperation
13.3. Background features of hard and easy cases
13.4. Mapping problems and the salience of the environmental ethos
13.5. Individual cost and collective gain
13.6. Comparing motives in the polar cases
13.7. The dimension of private significance
13.8. Self regulation policy: symbolic or real?
13.9. A non-moralistic approach to environmental responsibility
13.10. Self regulation in proportion to facilitation
Bibliography
Index.