Epistemic Duties
New Arguments, New Angles
Herausgeber: McCain, Kevin; Stapleford, Scott
Epistemic Duties
New Arguments, New Angles
Herausgeber: McCain, Kevin; Stapleford, Scott
- Gebundenes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address these closely related questions from a variety of new angles.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism324,99 €
- Epistemic Dilemmas198,99 €
- Toby SvobodaDuties Regarding Nature203,99 €
- Hamid VahidThe Dispositional Architecture of Epistemic Reasons194,99 €
- New Perspectives on Epistemic Closure184,99 €
- J. LeplinA Theory of Epistemic Justification74,99 €
- José MedinaThe Epistemology of Protest: Silencing, Epistemic Activism, and the Communicative Life of Resistance113,99 €
-
-
-
There are arguably moral, legal and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address these closely related questions from a variety of new angles.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 302
- Erscheinungstermin: 12. Oktober 2020
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 233mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 598g
- ISBN-13: 9780367141103
- ISBN-10: 0367141108
- Artikelnr.: 60016541
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 302
- Erscheinungstermin: 12. Oktober 2020
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 233mm x 152mm x 23mm
- Gewicht: 598g
- ISBN-13: 9780367141103
- ISBN-10: 0367141108
- Artikelnr.: 60016541
Kevin McCain is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. His published works include: Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification (Routledge, 2014), The Nature of Scientific Knowledge: An Explanatory Approach (2016), and with Kostas Kampourakis Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance (2019). Scott Stapleford is Professor of Philosophy at St. Thomas University, Fredericton. He is the author of Kant's Transcendental Arguments: Disciplining Pure Reason (2008), coauthor (with Tyron Goldschmidt) of Berkeley's Principles: Expanded and Explained (Routledge, 2016) and Hume's Enquiry: Expanded and Explained (Routledge, forthcoming), and coauthor (with Lorne Falkenstein and Molly Kao) of Logic Works: A Rigorous Introduction to Formal Logic (Routledge, forthcoming).
Introductory Note
Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford
Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Duty
1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control
Matthias Steup
2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity
Luis Oliveira
4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account
Mark T. Nelson
5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will
Robert Audi
6 We Are Like American Robins
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Part II: Epistemic Duties of Individuals
7 Bound by the Evidence
Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain
8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias
Lindsay Rettler and Bradley Rettler
9 Robust Justification
Jonathan Matheson
10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect
Anthony Robert Booth
11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty
Sharon Ryan
12 On What We Should Believe (And When (and Why) We Should Believe What We
Know We Should Not Believe)
Clayton Littlejohn
13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
Anne Meylan
Part III: Social Epistemic Duties
14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
Rik Peels
15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief
Rebecca Wallbank and Andrew Reisner
16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic
Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates?
Lisa Bortolotti and Sophie Stammers
17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism
Scott Aikin
18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others
Jennifer Lackey
Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford
Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Duty
1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control
Matthias Steup
2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity
Luis Oliveira
4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account
Mark T. Nelson
5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will
Robert Audi
6 We Are Like American Robins
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Part II: Epistemic Duties of Individuals
7 Bound by the Evidence
Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain
8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias
Lindsay Rettler and Bradley Rettler
9 Robust Justification
Jonathan Matheson
10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect
Anthony Robert Booth
11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty
Sharon Ryan
12 On What We Should Believe (And When (and Why) We Should Believe What We
Know We Should Not Believe)
Clayton Littlejohn
13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
Anne Meylan
Part III: Social Epistemic Duties
14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
Rik Peels
15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief
Rebecca Wallbank and Andrew Reisner
16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic
Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates?
Lisa Bortolotti and Sophie Stammers
17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism
Scott Aikin
18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others
Jennifer Lackey
Introductory Note
Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford
Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Duty
1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control
Matthias Steup
2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity
Luis Oliveira
4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account
Mark T. Nelson
5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will
Robert Audi
6 We Are Like American Robins
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Part II: Epistemic Duties of Individuals
7 Bound by the Evidence
Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain
8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias
Lindsay Rettler and Bradley Rettler
9 Robust Justification
Jonathan Matheson
10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect
Anthony Robert Booth
11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty
Sharon Ryan
12 On What We Should Believe (And When (and Why) We Should Believe What We
Know We Should Not Believe)
Clayton Littlejohn
13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
Anne Meylan
Part III: Social Epistemic Duties
14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
Rik Peels
15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief
Rebecca Wallbank and Andrew Reisner
16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic
Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates?
Lisa Bortolotti and Sophie Stammers
17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism
Scott Aikin
18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others
Jennifer Lackey
Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford
Part I: The Nature of Epistemic Duty
1 Epistemic Duty, Justified Belief, and Voluntary Control
Matthias Steup
2 Believing Badly: Doxastic Duties are not Epistemic Duties
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
3 Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity
Luis Oliveira
4 Epistemic Tension and Epistemic Duty: A Rossian Account
Mark T. Nelson
5 Intellectual Responsibility and the Scope of the Will
Robert Audi
6 We Are Like American Robins
Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Part II: Epistemic Duties of Individuals
7 Bound by the Evidence
Scott Stapleford and Kevin McCain
8 Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias
Lindsay Rettler and Bradley Rettler
9 Robust Justification
Jonathan Matheson
10 Ought to Believe vs. Ought to Reflect
Anthony Robert Booth
11 Wisdom, Open-Mindedness, and Epistemic Duty
Sharon Ryan
12 On What We Should Believe (And When (and Why) We Should Believe What We
Know We Should Not Believe)
Clayton Littlejohn
13 The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
Anne Meylan
Part III: Social Epistemic Duties
14 Responsibility for Fundamentalist Belief
Rik Peels
15 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief
Rebecca Wallbank and Andrew Reisner
16 When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic
Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates?
Lisa Bortolotti and Sophie Stammers
17 Dialectical Responsibility and Regress Skepticism
Scott Aikin
18 Epistemic Duties Regarding Others
Jennifer Lackey