Epistemic Value
Herausgeber: Haddock, Adrian; Pritchard, Duncan; Millar, Alan
Epistemic Value
Herausgeber: Haddock, Adrian; Pritchard, Duncan; Millar, Alan
- Gebundenes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
Epistemic Value is a collection of new essays by leading epistemologists, focusing on questions regarding the value of knowledge, such as: Is knowledge more valuable than true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal, or do other values enter the picture?
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- Simon J EvnineEpistemic Dimensions Personhood C81,99 €
- Miranda FrickerEpistemic Injustice148,99 €
- Richard SwinburneEpistemic Justification76,99 €
- Epistemic Entitlement152,99 €
- Lisa BortolottiThe Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs112,99 €
- Declan SmithiesThe Epistemic Role of Consciousness148,99 €
- Miranda FrickerEpistemic Injustice30,99 €
-
-
-
Epistemic Value is a collection of new essays by leading epistemologists, focusing on questions regarding the value of knowledge, such as: Is knowledge more valuable than true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal, or do other values enter the picture?
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press (UK)
- Seitenzahl: 370
- Erscheinungstermin: 16. November 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 166mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 721g
- ISBN-13: 9780199231188
- ISBN-10: 0199231184
- Artikelnr.: 27382647
- Verlag: Oxford University Press (UK)
- Seitenzahl: 370
- Erscheinungstermin: 16. November 2009
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 244mm x 166mm x 30mm
- Gewicht: 721g
- ISBN-13: 9780199231188
- ISBN-10: 0199231184
- Artikelnr.: 27382647
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008). Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005. Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
* Introduction
* Part One: The Value of Knowledge
* 1: Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson: Reliabilism and the Value of
Knowledge
* 2: Jason Baehr: Is There a Value Problem?
* 3: Martin Kusch: Testimony and the Value of Knowledge
* 4: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Value of Understanding
* 5: Michael R. DePaul: Ugly Analyses and Value
* 6: Ward E. Jones: The Goods and the Motivation of Believing
* 7: Matthew Weiner: Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
* 8: Pascal Engel: Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value
* 9: Wayne Riggs: Luck, Knowledge, and Control
* Part Two: Truth and Epistemic Appraisal
* 10: Michael P. Lynch: The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values
* 11: Stephen R. Grimm: Epistemic Normativity
* 12: Michael S. Brady: Curiosity and the Value of Truth
* 13: Berit Brogaard: Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop
Caring About Truth
* Appendix: Symposium on Jonathan Kvanvig's The Value of Knowledge and
the Pursuit of Understanding
* 14: Jonathan Kvanvig: Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the
Pursuit of Understanding
* 15: John Greco: The Value Problem
* 16: Catherine Z. Elgin: Is Understanding Factive?
* 17: Wayne D. Riggs: Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno
Requirement
* 18: Jonathan Kvanvig: Responses to Critics
* Part One: The Value of Knowledge
* 1: Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson: Reliabilism and the Value of
Knowledge
* 2: Jason Baehr: Is There a Value Problem?
* 3: Martin Kusch: Testimony and the Value of Knowledge
* 4: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Value of Understanding
* 5: Michael R. DePaul: Ugly Analyses and Value
* 6: Ward E. Jones: The Goods and the Motivation of Believing
* 7: Matthew Weiner: Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
* 8: Pascal Engel: Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value
* 9: Wayne Riggs: Luck, Knowledge, and Control
* Part Two: Truth and Epistemic Appraisal
* 10: Michael P. Lynch: The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values
* 11: Stephen R. Grimm: Epistemic Normativity
* 12: Michael S. Brady: Curiosity and the Value of Truth
* 13: Berit Brogaard: Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop
Caring About Truth
* Appendix: Symposium on Jonathan Kvanvig's The Value of Knowledge and
the Pursuit of Understanding
* 14: Jonathan Kvanvig: Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the
Pursuit of Understanding
* 15: John Greco: The Value Problem
* 16: Catherine Z. Elgin: Is Understanding Factive?
* 17: Wayne D. Riggs: Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno
Requirement
* 18: Jonathan Kvanvig: Responses to Critics
* Introduction
* Part One: The Value of Knowledge
* 1: Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson: Reliabilism and the Value of
Knowledge
* 2: Jason Baehr: Is There a Value Problem?
* 3: Martin Kusch: Testimony and the Value of Knowledge
* 4: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Value of Understanding
* 5: Michael R. DePaul: Ugly Analyses and Value
* 6: Ward E. Jones: The Goods and the Motivation of Believing
* 7: Matthew Weiner: Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
* 8: Pascal Engel: Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value
* 9: Wayne Riggs: Luck, Knowledge, and Control
* Part Two: Truth and Epistemic Appraisal
* 10: Michael P. Lynch: The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values
* 11: Stephen R. Grimm: Epistemic Normativity
* 12: Michael S. Brady: Curiosity and the Value of Truth
* 13: Berit Brogaard: Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop
Caring About Truth
* Appendix: Symposium on Jonathan Kvanvig's The Value of Knowledge and
the Pursuit of Understanding
* 14: Jonathan Kvanvig: Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the
Pursuit of Understanding
* 15: John Greco: The Value Problem
* 16: Catherine Z. Elgin: Is Understanding Factive?
* 17: Wayne D. Riggs: Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno
Requirement
* 18: Jonathan Kvanvig: Responses to Critics
* Part One: The Value of Knowledge
* 1: Alvin I. Goldman and Erik J. Olsson: Reliabilism and the Value of
Knowledge
* 2: Jason Baehr: Is There a Value Problem?
* 3: Martin Kusch: Testimony and the Value of Knowledge
* 4: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Value of Understanding
* 5: Michael R. DePaul: Ugly Analyses and Value
* 6: Ward E. Jones: The Goods and the Motivation of Believing
* 7: Matthew Weiner: Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
* 8: Pascal Engel: Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value
* 9: Wayne Riggs: Luck, Knowledge, and Control
* Part Two: Truth and Epistemic Appraisal
* 10: Michael P. Lynch: The Value of Truth and the Truth of Values
* 11: Stephen R. Grimm: Epistemic Normativity
* 12: Michael S. Brady: Curiosity and the Value of Truth
* 13: Berit Brogaard: Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop
Caring About Truth
* Appendix: Symposium on Jonathan Kvanvig's The Value of Knowledge and
the Pursuit of Understanding
* 14: Jonathan Kvanvig: Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the
Pursuit of Understanding
* 15: John Greco: The Value Problem
* 16: Catherine Z. Elgin: Is Understanding Factive?
* 17: Wayne D. Riggs: Understanding, Knowledge and the Meno
Requirement
* 18: Jonathan Kvanvig: Responses to Critics