Duncan Pritchard offers an original account of perceptual knowledge. He argues that it is paradigmatically constituted by true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. This resolves the issue between intermalism and externalism, and poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology.
Duncan Pritchard offers an original account of perceptual knowledge. He argues that it is paradigmatically constituted by true belief that enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. This resolves the issue between intermalism and externalism, and poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this field, including the books Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with A. Haddock & A. Millar, Oxford University Press, 2010). He is editor-in-chief of the journals Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (Oxford University Press) and (with D. Machuca) International Journal for the Study of Skepticism (Brill). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
Inhaltsangabe
* Acknowledgements * Introduction * Part One: Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline * 1: Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass * 2: Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism * 3: Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism * 4: Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism * 5: Seeing That P and Knowing That P * 6: Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction * 7: Resolving the Access Problem * Notes to Part One * Part Two: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support * Introductory Remarks * 1: The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge * 2: Relevant Alternatives and Closure * 3: Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission and Favouring * 4: Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support * 5: Diagnosis * 6: A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory * 7: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism * Notes to Part Two * Part Three: Radical Scepticism * Introductory Remarks * 1: Radical Scepticism * 2: Mooreanism * 3: Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism * 4: A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism * 5: Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism * 6: Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies * 7: Radical Scepticism and Quietism * 8: Knowing and Saying That One Knows * 9: Concluding Remarks * Notes to Part Three * Bibliography * Index
* Acknowledgements * Introduction * Part One: Epistemological Disjunctivism in Outline * 1: Epistemological Disjunctivism: A First Pass * 2: Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivism * 3: Three Prima Facie Problems for Epistemological Disjunctivism * 4: Metaphysical and Epistemological Disjunctivism * 5: Seeing That P and Knowing That P * 6: Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Epistemic Externalism/Internalism Distinction * 7: Resolving the Access Problem * Notes to Part One * Part Two: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support * Introductory Remarks * 1: The Relevant Alternatives Account of Perceptual Knowledge * 2: Relevant Alternatives and Closure * 3: Three Epistemic Principles: Discrimination, Evidential Transmission and Favouring * 4: Favouring and Discriminating Epistemic Support * 5: Diagnosis * 6: A Two-Tiered Relevant Alternatives Theory * 7: Favouring versus Discriminating Epistemic Support and Epistemological Disjunctivism * Notes to Part Two * Part Three: Radical Scepticism * Introductory Remarks * 1: Radical Scepticism * 2: Mooreanism * 3: Contemporary Neo-Mooreanism * 4: A Simpleminded Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism * 5: Motivating Epistemological Disjunctivist Neo-Mooreanism * 6: Overriding versus Undercutting Anti-Sceptical Strategies * 7: Radical Scepticism and Quietism * 8: Knowing and Saying That One Knows * 9: Concluding Remarks * Notes to Part Three * Bibliography * Index
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