- Gebundenes Buch
- Merkliste
- Auf die Merkliste
- Bewerten Bewerten
- Teilen
- Produkt teilen
- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. All essays are specifically written for this collection by leading researchers in this relatively new and developing field, bringing together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and skepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and cognitive science, Cartesian epistemology and virtue epistemology.
Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
- Duncan PritchardWhat is this thing called Knowledge?174,99 €
- Kelly BeckerEpistemology Modalized216,99 €
- The Epistemology of Group Disagreement194,99 €
- Aaron ZimmermanMoral Epistemology184,99 €
- Modes of Truth194,99 €
- Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered184,99 €
- McDowell and the Hermeneutic Tradition194,99 €
-
-
-
This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge. All essays are specifically written for this collection by leading researchers in this relatively new and developing field, bringing together work from backgrounds such as pragmatism and skepticism, cognitive theories of emotions and cognitive science, Cartesian epistemology and virtue epistemology.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 220
- Erscheinungstermin: 14. August 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 14mm
- Gewicht: 490g
- ISBN-13: 9780754661146
- ISBN-10: 0754661148
- Artikelnr.: 44972012
- Verlag: Routledge
- Seitenzahl: 220
- Erscheinungstermin: 14. August 2008
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 234mm x 156mm x 14mm
- Gewicht: 490g
- ISBN-13: 9780754661146
- ISBN-10: 0754661148
- Artikelnr.: 44972012
Dr Georg Brun, Senior Research Fellow, Environmental Philosophy Group, Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zÿrich, Switzerland; Dr Ulvi Doguoglu, Senior Research Associate, University of Zÿrich, Switzerland and Dr Dominique Kuenzle, Research Assistant, Department of Philosophy, University of Zÿrich, Switzerland.
Introduction A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology?
Georg Brun
Dominique Kuenzle*We would like to thank Christoph Baumberger
Monika Betzler
Simone Dohle
Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn
Michael Roth and Alessandra Tanesini for helpful comments on earlier drafts.; Chapter One Emotion and Understanding
Catherine Z. Elgin*I am grateful to Amélie Rorty
Sabine Döring
and members of the University of Zürich Workshop on Epistemology and Emotions for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.; Chapter Two Epistemic Immediacy
Doubt and Anxiety: On a Role for Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation
Christopher Hookway; Chapter Three Virtues
Emotions and Fallibilism
Alessandra Tanesini*An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy Department at the University of Hull. I would like to thank Richard Gray
Michael Durrant
the editors of this volume and the audience in Hull for several very useful comments and queries.; Chapter Four Conflict Without Contradiction
Sabine A. Döring; Chapter Five Epistemic Immediacy and Reflection
Daniel Dohrn; Chapter Six Critical Reflections on Affective Epistemology
Markus Wild*Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the University of Zürich and the Humboldt University of Berlin. Many thanks to Simone Ungerer
Anik Waldow
Christopher Hookway
Martin Lenz
Dominik Perler
Alexander Staudacher
and Ulvi Do?uo?lu for discussion and criticism.; Chapter Seven Misleading Emotions
Peter Goldie; Chapter Eight How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs
Desires and Feelings as Neural Activity
Paul Thagard*I am grateful to Ulvi Do?uo?lu and Benoit Hardy-Vallée for comments on an earlier draft. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada provided research support.; Chapter Nine Epistemic Feelings
Ronald de Sousa*This paper has benefited as a result of many judicious comments by the editors
for which I am most grateful.;
Georg Brun
Dominique Kuenzle*We would like to thank Christoph Baumberger
Monika Betzler
Simone Dohle
Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn
Michael Roth and Alessandra Tanesini for helpful comments on earlier drafts.; Chapter One Emotion and Understanding
Catherine Z. Elgin*I am grateful to Amélie Rorty
Sabine Döring
and members of the University of Zürich Workshop on Epistemology and Emotions for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.; Chapter Two Epistemic Immediacy
Doubt and Anxiety: On a Role for Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation
Christopher Hookway; Chapter Three Virtues
Emotions and Fallibilism
Alessandra Tanesini*An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy Department at the University of Hull. I would like to thank Richard Gray
Michael Durrant
the editors of this volume and the audience in Hull for several very useful comments and queries.; Chapter Four Conflict Without Contradiction
Sabine A. Döring; Chapter Five Epistemic Immediacy and Reflection
Daniel Dohrn; Chapter Six Critical Reflections on Affective Epistemology
Markus Wild*Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the University of Zürich and the Humboldt University of Berlin. Many thanks to Simone Ungerer
Anik Waldow
Christopher Hookway
Martin Lenz
Dominik Perler
Alexander Staudacher
and Ulvi Do?uo?lu for discussion and criticism.; Chapter Seven Misleading Emotions
Peter Goldie; Chapter Eight How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs
Desires and Feelings as Neural Activity
Paul Thagard*I am grateful to Ulvi Do?uo?lu and Benoit Hardy-Vallée for comments on an earlier draft. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada provided research support.; Chapter Nine Epistemic Feelings
Ronald de Sousa*This paper has benefited as a result of many judicious comments by the editors
for which I am most grateful.;
Introduction A New Role for Emotions in Epistemology?
Georg Brun
Dominique Kuenzle*We would like to thank Christoph Baumberger
Monika Betzler
Simone Dohle
Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn
Michael Roth and Alessandra Tanesini for helpful comments on earlier drafts.; Chapter One Emotion and Understanding
Catherine Z. Elgin*I am grateful to Amélie Rorty
Sabine Döring
and members of the University of Zürich Workshop on Epistemology and Emotions for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.; Chapter Two Epistemic Immediacy
Doubt and Anxiety: On a Role for Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation
Christopher Hookway; Chapter Three Virtues
Emotions and Fallibilism
Alessandra Tanesini*An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy Department at the University of Hull. I would like to thank Richard Gray
Michael Durrant
the editors of this volume and the audience in Hull for several very useful comments and queries.; Chapter Four Conflict Without Contradiction
Sabine A. Döring; Chapter Five Epistemic Immediacy and Reflection
Daniel Dohrn; Chapter Six Critical Reflections on Affective Epistemology
Markus Wild*Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the University of Zürich and the Humboldt University of Berlin. Many thanks to Simone Ungerer
Anik Waldow
Christopher Hookway
Martin Lenz
Dominik Perler
Alexander Staudacher
and Ulvi Do?uo?lu for discussion and criticism.; Chapter Seven Misleading Emotions
Peter Goldie; Chapter Eight How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs
Desires and Feelings as Neural Activity
Paul Thagard*I am grateful to Ulvi Do?uo?lu and Benoit Hardy-Vallée for comments on an earlier draft. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada provided research support.; Chapter Nine Epistemic Feelings
Ronald de Sousa*This paper has benefited as a result of many judicious comments by the editors
for which I am most grateful.;
Georg Brun
Dominique Kuenzle*We would like to thank Christoph Baumberger
Monika Betzler
Simone Dohle
Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn
Michael Roth and Alessandra Tanesini for helpful comments on earlier drafts.; Chapter One Emotion and Understanding
Catherine Z. Elgin*I am grateful to Amélie Rorty
Sabine Döring
and members of the University of Zürich Workshop on Epistemology and Emotions for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.; Chapter Two Epistemic Immediacy
Doubt and Anxiety: On a Role for Affective States in Epistemic Evaluation
Christopher Hookway; Chapter Three Virtues
Emotions and Fallibilism
Alessandra Tanesini*An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Philosophy Department at the University of Hull. I would like to thank Richard Gray
Michael Durrant
the editors of this volume and the audience in Hull for several very useful comments and queries.; Chapter Four Conflict Without Contradiction
Sabine A. Döring; Chapter Five Epistemic Immediacy and Reflection
Daniel Dohrn; Chapter Six Critical Reflections on Affective Epistemology
Markus Wild*Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the University of Zürich and the Humboldt University of Berlin. Many thanks to Simone Ungerer
Anik Waldow
Christopher Hookway
Martin Lenz
Dominik Perler
Alexander Staudacher
and Ulvi Do?uo?lu for discussion and criticism.; Chapter Seven Misleading Emotions
Peter Goldie; Chapter Eight How Cognition Meets Emotion: Beliefs
Desires and Feelings as Neural Activity
Paul Thagard*I am grateful to Ulvi Do?uo?lu and Benoit Hardy-Vallée for comments on an earlier draft. The Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada provided research support.; Chapter Nine Epistemic Feelings
Ronald de Sousa*This paper has benefited as a result of many judicious comments by the editors
for which I am most grateful.;