Bimal Krishna Matilal
Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis
Herausgeber: Ganeri, Jornardon
Bimal Krishna Matilal
Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis
Herausgeber: Ganeri, Jornardon
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This landmark classic marks the beginning of a new approach to Indian philosophy. While older approaches were born from the assumption that critical thinking was unknown to the East and all philosophical endeavor was assumed to be a manifestation of religious doctrine or a form of mysticism, Matilal brilliantly succeeds in dispelling these assumptions and so opens up the rich traditions of Indian philosophical analysis to the modern reader.
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This landmark classic marks the beginning of a new approach to Indian philosophy. While older approaches were born from the assumption that critical thinking was unknown to the East and all philosophical endeavor was assumed to be a manifestation of religious doctrine or a form of mysticism, Matilal brilliantly succeeds in dispelling these assumptions and so opens up the rich traditions of Indian philosophical analysis to the modern reader.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 168
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. September 2015
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 213mm x 140mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 136g
- ISBN-13: 9780199460939
- ISBN-10: 0199460930
- Artikelnr.: 47870948
- Verlag: Oxford University Press, USA
- Seitenzahl: 168
- Erscheinungstermin: 25. September 2015
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 213mm x 140mm x 15mm
- Gewicht: 136g
- ISBN-13: 9780199460939
- ISBN-10: 0199460930
- Artikelnr.: 47870948
Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935-91) was Spalding Professor of Eastern Religions and Ethics, All Souls College, Oxford. Jonardon Ganeri is Recurrent Visiting Professor of Philosophy, King's College London, and Global Professor, New York University.
* Preface to the New Edition: J. Ganeri * Preface to the First Edition * Chronological Table of Philosophers * l. Perception and Language * 1.1. General remarks on the problem * 1.2. Early Nyaáya theory of perception * 1.3. The rise of idealism * 1.4. Bhartrhari's theory of knowledge: 'Construction'(vikalpa) * 1.5. Di
ága's theory of perception * 1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha) * 1.7. Di
aga and modem reductionism * 2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception * 2.1. A critique of the Di
aga school * 2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents * 2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (s
mav
ya) * 2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors' * 2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms * 2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference * 2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (j
ti) * 2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception * 2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-ny
ya: 'Simple' properties * 2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions * 3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics * 3.1. Preliminary remarks * 3.2. The notion of 'substance' : P
nini's rule 1.2.64 * 3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': P
nini's rule 5.1.119 * 3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vy
di and V
japy
yana * 3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance' * 3.6. Vy
di's theory of meaning * 3.7. An analysis of Vy
di's theory in modem terminology * 4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic * 4.1. Non-referring expressions in language * 4.2. The riddle of 'non-being' * 4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic * 4.4. The Ny
ya-Buddhist controversy * 4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy * 4.6. The implicit Ny
ya semantic principle * 4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation * 4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism * 5. Negation and the M
dhyamika Dialectic * 5.1. The M
dhyamika attitude-'emptiness' * 5.2. Two levels of truth * 5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world * 5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness' * 5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes * 5.6. Two aspects of negation * 5.7. 'Mysticism' and the M
dhyamika school * Bibliographical References * Index
ága's theory of perception * 1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha) * 1.7. Di
aga and modem reductionism * 2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception * 2.1. A critique of the Di
aga school * 2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents * 2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (s
mav
ya) * 2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors' * 2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms * 2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference * 2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (j
ti) * 2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception * 2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-ny
ya: 'Simple' properties * 2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions * 3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics * 3.1. Preliminary remarks * 3.2. The notion of 'substance' : P
nini's rule 1.2.64 * 3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': P
nini's rule 5.1.119 * 3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vy
di and V
japy
yana * 3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance' * 3.6. Vy
di's theory of meaning * 3.7. An analysis of Vy
di's theory in modem terminology * 4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic * 4.1. Non-referring expressions in language * 4.2. The riddle of 'non-being' * 4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic * 4.4. The Ny
ya-Buddhist controversy * 4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy * 4.6. The implicit Ny
ya semantic principle * 4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation * 4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism * 5. Negation and the M
dhyamika Dialectic * 5.1. The M
dhyamika attitude-'emptiness' * 5.2. Two levels of truth * 5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world * 5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness' * 5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes * 5.6. Two aspects of negation * 5.7. 'Mysticism' and the M
dhyamika school * Bibliographical References * Index
* Preface to the New Edition: J. Ganeri * Preface to the First Edition * Chronological Table of Philosophers * l. Perception and Language * 1.1. General remarks on the problem * 1.2. Early Nyaáya theory of perception * 1.3. The rise of idealism * 1.4. Bhartrhari's theory of knowledge: 'Construction'(vikalpa) * 1.5. Di
ága's theory of perception * 1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha) * 1.7. Di
aga and modem reductionism * 2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception * 2.1. A critique of the Di
aga school * 2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents * 2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (s
mav
ya) * 2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors' * 2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms * 2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference * 2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (j
ti) * 2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception * 2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-ny
ya: 'Simple' properties * 2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions * 3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics * 3.1. Preliminary remarks * 3.2. The notion of 'substance' : P
nini's rule 1.2.64 * 3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': P
nini's rule 5.1.119 * 3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vy
di and V
japy
yana * 3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance' * 3.6. Vy
di's theory of meaning * 3.7. An analysis of Vy
di's theory in modem terminology * 4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic * 4.1. Non-referring expressions in language * 4.2. The riddle of 'non-being' * 4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic * 4.4. The Ny
ya-Buddhist controversy * 4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy * 4.6. The implicit Ny
ya semantic principle * 4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation * 4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism * 5. Negation and the M
dhyamika Dialectic * 5.1. The M
dhyamika attitude-'emptiness' * 5.2. Two levels of truth * 5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world * 5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness' * 5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes * 5.6. Two aspects of negation * 5.7. 'Mysticism' and the M
dhyamika school * Bibliographical References * Index
ága's theory of perception * 1.6. Word-meaning as 'exclusion' (apoha) * 1.7. Di
aga and modem reductionism * 2. Individuals, Universals, and Perception * 2.1. A critique of the Di
aga school * 2.2. Material bodies and their atomic constituents * 2.3. 'Inseparable' relation (s
mav
ya) * 2.4. The law of contradiction and the 'delimitors' * 2.5. Universals as meanings of general terms * 2.6. Uses of articles and quantifiers: 'Modes' of reference * 2.7. The problem of 'real' universal (j
ti) * 2.8. The notion of 'propositional' perception * 2.9. Non-qualificative perception in Navya-ny
ya: 'Simple' properties * 2.1 0. Terms and propositional assertions * 3. Early Grammarians on Philosophical Semantics * 3.1. Preliminary remarks * 3.2. The notion of 'substance' : P
nini's rule 1.2.64 * 3.3. 'Substance' and 'quality': P
nini's rule 5.1.119 * 3.4. Two aspects of meaning: Vy
di and V
japy
yana * 3.5. Bhartrhari's definition of 'substance' * 3.6. Vy
di's theory of meaning * 3.7. An analysis of Vy
di's theory in modem terminology * 4. Empty Subject Terms in Logic * 4.1. Non-referring expressions in language * 4.2. The riddle of 'non-being' * 4.3. The status of 'example' in Indian logic * 4.4. The Ny
ya-Buddhist controversy * 4.5. The epistemological significance of the controversy * 4.6. The implicit Ny
ya semantic principle * 4.7. Interpretation of existence and negation * 4.8. The pan-fictional approach of Buddhism * 5. Negation and the M
dhyamika Dialectic * 5.1. The M
dhyamika attitude-'emptiness' * 5.2. Two levels of truth * 5.3. The indeterminacy of the phenomenal world * 5.4. The paradox of 'emptiness' * 5.5. Sophistry and the semantical paradoxes * 5.6. Two aspects of negation * 5.7. 'Mysticism' and the M
dhyamika school * Bibliographical References * Index