David M Levy, Sandra J Peart
Escape from Democracy
The Role of Experts and the Public in Economic Policy
David M Levy, Sandra J Peart
Escape from Democracy
The Role of Experts and the Public in Economic Policy
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- Produkterinnerung
- Produkterinnerung
This text interrogates the role of experts in governing and proposes a viable alternative: governing by democratic discussion.
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This text interrogates the role of experts in governing and proposes a viable alternative: governing by democratic discussion.
Produktdetails
- Produktdetails
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 290
- Erscheinungstermin: 24. Dezember 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 17mm
- Gewicht: 482g
- ISBN-13: 9781316507131
- ISBN-10: 1316507130
- Artikelnr.: 45163425
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Seitenzahl: 290
- Erscheinungstermin: 24. Dezember 2016
- Englisch
- Abmessung: 228mm x 151mm x 17mm
- Gewicht: 482g
- ISBN-13: 9781316507131
- ISBN-10: 1316507130
- Artikelnr.: 45163425
David M. Levy is Professor of Economics at George Mason University, Washington DC. He has worked with Sandra J. Peart at the University of Richmond for fifteen years, and both have co-directed the Summer Institute for the History of Economics and have been honored by the History of Economics Society.
Acknowledgments
Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction
Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition
3. The Knightian moment
4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?
Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal
6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth
Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy
8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts
Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts
10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise
11. Inducing greater transparency
Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?
Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction
Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition
3. The Knightian moment
4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?
Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal
6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth
Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy
8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts
Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts
10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise
11. Inducing greater transparency
Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?
Acknowledgments
Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction
Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition
3. The Knightian moment
4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?
Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal
6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth
Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy
8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts
Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts
10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise
11. Inducing greater transparency
Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?
Part I. Introductory Themes: 1. Introduction
Part II. The Discussion Tradition: 2. On 'strongly fortified minds': self-restraint and cooperation in the discussion tradition
3. The Knightian moment
4. The rise of new welfare economics: an end to endogenous goals?
Part III. When Linear Models Fail: Two Cases: 5. Experts and eugenics: 'science' privileges a social goal
6. Expert judgment and Soviet growth
Part IV. An End to Discussion: Secrecy and the Temptation to Bias: 7. Experts and the philosopher's stone: John Law's secret financial alchemy
8. The consequence of suppressing discussion: imprudence with biased experts
Part V. Getting the Best out of Experts: 9. A revised code of ethics for experts
10. Mitigating the consequences of factional expertise
11. Inducing greater transparency
Part VI. Conclusion: 12. Vox populi?