P. Heller / M. Starr / A. Starrett (eds.)

Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow

Volume 3, Uncertainty, Information, and Communication
Herausgeber: Heller, Walter P.; Starrett, David A.; Starr, Ross M.

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Professor Kenneth J. Arrow is one of the most distinguished economic theorists. He has played a major role in shaping the present state of the subject and now is to be honored by the publication of three volumes of essays on economic theory. Each volume deals with a different area of economic theory. The books include contributions by some of the best economic theorists from the United Stated, Japan, Israel and Europe. This third volume is entitled Uncertainty, information, and communication.

Table of contents:
Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3. Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5. Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and Organization: 7. The cost of communication in economic organization: II Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organizations? W. M. Gorman; 9. Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative limited communication systems: centralization versus interchange of information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.

Produktdetails

• Verlag: Cambridge University Press
• Seitenzahl: 304
• Erscheinungstermin: 30. November 2006
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 235mm x 157mm x 22mm
• Gewicht: 649g
• ISBN-13: 9780521327046
• ISBN-10: 0521327040
• Artikelnr.: 22576307

Inhaltsangabe

Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger
B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3.
Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive
allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and
Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5.
Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas
Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a
new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and
Organisation: 7. The cost of communication in economic organisation: II
Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organisations? W. M. Gorman; 9.
Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data
compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative
limited communication systems: centralisation versus interchange of
information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.