Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow
Volume 3, Uncertainty, Information, and Communication
Herausgeber: Heller, Walter P.; Starrett, David A.; Starr, Ross M.
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Professor Kenneth J. Arrow is one of the most distinguished economic theorists. He has played a major role in shaping the present state of the subject and now is to be honored by the publication of three volumes of essays on economic theory. Each volume deals with a different area of economic theory. The books include contributions by some of the best economic theorists from the United Stated, Japan, Israel and Europe. This third volume is entitled Uncertainty, information, and communication.Table of contents:Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger B. Myerson...
Professor Kenneth J. Arrow is one of the most distinguished economic theorists. He has played a major role in shaping the present state of the subject and now is to be honored by the publication of three volumes of essays on economic theory. Each volume deals with a different area of economic theory. The books include contributions by some of the best economic theorists from the United Stated, Japan, Israel and Europe. This third volume is entitled Uncertainty, information, and communication.
Table of contents:
Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3. Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5. Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and Organization: 7. The cost of communication in economic organization: II Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organizations? W. M. Gorman; 9. Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative limited communication systems: centralization versus interchange of information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
Table of contents:
Part I. Uncertainty: 1. Negotiation in games: a theoretical overview Roger B. Myerson; 2. Repeated moral hazard with low discount rates Roy Radner; 3. Existence, regularity, and constrained suboptimality of competitive allocations when the asset market is incomplete John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis; 4. Asset pricing theories Michael Rothschild; 5. Independence versus dominance in personal probability axioms Thomas Marschak; 6. Univariate and multivariate comparisons of risk aversion: a new approach Menahem E. Yaari; Part II. Information, Communication and Organization: 7. The cost of communication in economic organization: II Hajime Oniki; 8. Assembling efficient organizations? W. M. Gorman; 9. Optimal Bayesian mechanisms Eric S. Maskin; 10. Incentive theory with data compression Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont; 11. Alternative limited communication systems: centralization versus interchange of information Jerry R. Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont.
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