Anthony Brueckner is recognized as one of the leading contemporary investigators of the problem of skepticism. This collection brings together Brueckner's most important work in this area, providing a connected and comprehensive guide to the complex state of play on this intensively studied area of philosophy.
Anthony Brueckner is recognized as one of the leading contemporary investigators of the problem of skepticism. This collection brings together Brueckner's most important work in this area, providing a connected and comprehensive guide to the complex state of play on this intensively studied area of philosophy.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Anthony Brueckner is Professor of Philosophy at University of California, Santa Barbara. He has written extensively in epistemology over the past 25 years. He has also written in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, Kant, personal identity, free will, and the metaphysics of death.
Inhaltsangabe
Introduction I. Transcendental Arguments against Skepticism 1: Transcendental Arguments I 2: Transcendental Arguments II 3: The Anti-Skeptical Strategy of the Refutation of Idealism 4: Modest Transcendental Arguments 5: Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism 6: Stroud's 'Transcendental Arguments' Reconsidered II. Semantic Answers to Skepticism 7: Brains in a Vat 8: Semantic Answers to Skepticism 9: Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses 10: Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge 11: Terms of Envatment 12: Charity and Skepticism 13: The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again 14: Singular Thought and Cartesian Philosophy III. Self-Knowledge 15: Scepticism about Knowledge of Content 16: Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World 17: Externalism and Memory 18: What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori 19: The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism 20: Brewer on the McKinsey Problem 21: Wright on the McKinsey Problem 22: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent 23: The Resiliency of the McKinsey Problem IV. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure 24: Epistemic Universalizability Principles 25: Why Nozick is a Sceptic 26: Skepticism and Epistemic Closure 27: Unfair to Nozick 28: Problems with the Wright Route to Scepticism 29: The Structure of the Skeptical Argument 30: Klein on Closure and Skepticism 31: The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism 32: Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge 33: Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamso 34: Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism 35: Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic 36: ~K~SK Acknowledgements Bibliography Index
Introduction I. Transcendental Arguments against Skepticism 1: Transcendental Arguments I 2: Transcendental Arguments II 3: The Anti-Skeptical Strategy of the Refutation of Idealism 4: Modest Transcendental Arguments 5: Transcendental Arguments from Content Externalism 6: Stroud's 'Transcendental Arguments' Reconsidered II. Semantic Answers to Skepticism 7: Brains in a Vat 8: Semantic Answers to Skepticism 9: Trees, Computer Program Features, and Skeptical Hypotheses 10: Cartesian Skepticism, Content Externalism, and Self-Knowledge 11: Terms of Envatment 12: Charity and Skepticism 13: The Omniscient Interpreter Rides Again 14: Singular Thought and Cartesian Philosophy III. Self-Knowledge 15: Scepticism about Knowledge of Content 16: Knowledge of Content and Knowledge of the World 17: Externalism and Memory 18: What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori 19: The Characteristic Thesis of Anti-Individualism 20: Brewer on the McKinsey Problem 21: Wright on the McKinsey Problem 22: Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistent 23: The Resiliency of the McKinsey Problem IV. Skepticism and Epistemic Closure 24: Epistemic Universalizability Principles 25: Why Nozick is a Sceptic 26: Skepticism and Epistemic Closure 27: Unfair to Nozick 28: Problems with the Wright Route to Scepticism 29: The Structure of the Skeptical Argument 30: Klein on Closure and Skepticism 31: The Elusive Virtues of Contextualism 32: Strategies for Refuting Closure for Knowledge 33: Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamso 34: Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism 35: Some Comfort for the Closure Skeptic 36: ~K~SK Acknowledgements Bibliography Index
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