Essentials of Biological Security

A Global Perspective
Herausgegeben:Shang, Lijun; Zhang, Weiwen; Dando, Malcolm

• Gebundenes Buch

Produktbeschreibung

Essentials of Biological Security

A guide to minimizing the threat of misusing benignly intended and dual-use biological research

In Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective, a team of distinguished researchers delivers a fundamental resource designed to raise awareness and understanding of biological security as it pertains to the malign manipulation of benignly intended scientific research.

Written by experts who have spent decades involved in biological security issues, the book is systematically organized to make it accessible to a wide range of life scientists likely to encounter dangerous opportunities for the deliberate misuse of their research. Readers will also find:
_ A thorough introduction to biological security and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) threat spectrum
_ Comprehensive explorations of the history of biological weapons from antiquity to modern day
_ Practical discussions of dual-use technologies and how to minimize their risk
_ Expert analyses of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and other relevant international agreements and organizations

Perfect for professionals working in life sciences, medicine, global health, biosafety, and biosecurity, Essentials of Biological Security: A Global Perspective will also benefit anyone with an interest in and being responsible for biological security.

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Produktdetails

• Verlag: Wiley / Wiley & Sons
• Artikelnr. des Verlages: 1W394189010
• 1. Auflage
• Seitenzahl: 320
• Erscheinungstermin: 27. Februar 2024
• Englisch
• Abmessung: 249mm x 172mm x 21mm
• Gewicht: 760g
• ISBN-13: 9781394189014
• ISBN-10: 139418901X
• Artikelnr.: 69603284

Autorenporträt

Lijun Shang, PhD, is Professor of Biomedical Sciences in the School of Human Sciences at London Metropolitan University, UK. He is the founding Director of the Biological Security Research Centre. His research focuses primarily on ion channels in the fields of health and disease. Weiwen Zhang, PhD, is Baiyang Chair Professor of Microbiology and Biochemical Engineering at Tianjin University of China, China. His recent research is focused on synthetic biology and governance of dual-use issues, and he currently serves as Chief Scientist of the National Key Research and Development Program of Synthetic Biology in China. Malcolm Dando, PhD, is a Fellow of the UK Royal Society of Biology. He is Emeritus Professor at the University of Bradford, UK and is the author of Neuroscience and the Problem of Dual Use: Neuroethics in New Brain Projects.

Inhaltsangabe

Endorsement xv

List of Figures xvii

List of Tables xviii

List of Contributors xix

Foreword xxi

Acknowledgements xxv

Acronyms xxvii

1 Biological Security After the Pandemic 1
Lijun Shang, Weiwen Zhang, and Malcolm Dando

1.1 The Objective of the Book 2

1.2 The Structure of the Book 7

1.3 Overview of the Chapters 7

Author Biography 8

References 9

2 Falling Between the Cracks and by the Sides: Can Disarmament Treaties Respond to Scientific and Technological Developments? 11
Jean Pascal Zanders

2.1 Introduction 12

2.2 Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Relationship to CBW 13

2.2.1 The Impact of Germ Theory on the 'Poison' Concept 14

2.2.2 The Impact of Chemistry on the 'Poison' Concept 15

2.3 Capturing Evolving Concepts of Disease and Toxicants in Restraining Warfare 16

2.4 Further Development of the Control of Toxic Weapons 17

2.4.1 Confirming the Semantic Bifurcation 18

2.4.2 Of Humanitarian Foundations and a Dual-Use Quandary 20

2.5 Implications of Evolving Concepts and S&T Developments for Disarmament Law 21

2.5.1 Institutional Interests 22

2.5.2 Semantic Shifts as Indicators of Scientific and Technological Advancements 22

2.5.3 The Future Dimension of Disarmament 23

2.6 Conclusions: Responding to S&T Developments 25

Author Biography 28

References 28

3 A Multifaceted Threat 31
Gemma Bowsher

3.1 Introduction 32

3.2 Assessing the Utility and Scope of Biological Weapons at Various Scales 33

3.3 Diverse Objectives of Bioweapon Use: Past and Present 34

3.4 Evolving Biotechnologies 36

3.5 Changing Biothreat Landscapes 37

3.5.1 Cyber-Dependency 38

3.5.2 Disinformation 38

3.6 Conclusion 39

Author Biography 40

References 40

4 Biological Weapons from the Ancient World to 1945 43
Brett Edwards

4.1 Introduction 44

4.2 Map of the Literature 45

4.3 Historical Review 46

4.3.1 Pre-history (72,000-500 BCE) 46

4.3.2 Ancient History (500 BCE-1000 AD) 47

4.3.3 Medieval and Early Modern (1000-1750 AD) 48

4.3.4 Late Modern (1750-1915 AD) 49

4.3.5 World War I (1914-1918 AD) 49

4.3.6 Inter-War Years (1918-1939 AD) 50

4.3.7 World War II 51

4.4 Conclusions 52

Author Biography 53

References 53

5 Biological Weapons from 1946 to 2000 57
Brian Balmer

5.1 Introduction 57

5.2 Overview of State BW Programmes 58

5.3 Offensive Aspects of BW Programmes 61

5.3.1 Human Exposure and Experimentation 62

5.4 Non-state Actors 63

5.5 Drivers and Inhibitors of State BW Programmes 65

5.6 Conclusions 66

Author Biography 67

References 67

6 The Problem of Dual Use in the Twenty-first Century 69
Kathryn Nixdorff

6.1 Relationship of the Advances in Science and Technology to the BTWC 70

6.2 Evolution of the Dual-Use Dilemma 71

6.2.1 Example 1. The Mousepox Experiment (2001) 73

6.2.2 Example 2. Synthesis of the Poliovirus Genome and Recovery of Infectious Virus (2002) 74

6.2.3 Example 3. Reconstruction of the 'Spanish Flu' Influenza Virus of 1918 (2005) 74

6.2.4 Example 4. Alteration of the Host Range and Increase in the Transmissibility of the H5N1 Avian Influenza Virus (2012) 75

6.3 DURC Criteria with Examples in Each Case of Published Research Reports