This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to estimate firms' strategies directly and examine how these strategies determine market power. A detailed technical appendix reviews the relevant information-theoretic and other econometric models that are used…mehr
This book presents, compares, and develops various techniques for estimating market power - the ability to set price profitably above marginal cost - and strategies - the game-theoretic plans used by firms to compete with rivals. The authors start by examining static model approaches to estimating market power. They extend the analysis to dynamic models. Finally, they develop methods to estimate firms' strategies directly and examine how these strategies determine market power. A detailed technical appendix reviews the relevant information-theoretic and other econometric models that are used throughout. Questions and detailed answers for students and researchers are provided in the book for easy use.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Jeffrey M. Perloff is a professor in and chair of the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California at Berkeley. His textbooks are Modern Industrial Organization (co-authored with Dennis Carlton) and Microeconomics. Professor Perloff has been an editor of Industrial Relations and an associate editor of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. He is currently an associate editor of the Journal of Productivity Analysis and edits the Journal of Industrial Organization Education. A fellow of the American Agricultural Economics Association, his economic research covers industrial organization, marketing, labor, trade, and econometrics. He has consulted with a number of nonprofit organizations and government agencies including the Federal Trade Commission and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Agriculture.
Inhaltsangabe
1. Introduction 2. Structure-conduct-performance 3. Industry models of market power 4. Differentiated-product structural models 5. Strategic reasons for a dynamic estimation model 6. Dynamic games involving economic fundamentals 7. Estimation of dynamic games involving economic fundamentals 8. Estimation of market power using a linear-quadratic model 9. Estimating strategies: theory 10. Estimating strategies: case studies Statistical appendix Answers.
1. Introduction 2. Structure-conduct-performance 3. Industry models of market power 4. Differentiated-product structural models 5. Strategic reasons for a dynamic estimation model 6. Dynamic games involving economic fundamentals 7. Estimation of dynamic games involving economic fundamentals 8. Estimation of market power using a linear-quadratic model 9. Estimating strategies: theory 10. Estimating strategies: case studies Statistical appendix Answers.
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