This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms. Featuring papers from all fields of social choice and game theory, it presents probability arguments to allow readers to gain a better understanding of the properties of decision rules and of the functioning of modern democracies. In particular, it focuses on the legacy of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, two prominent scholars who have made important contributions to this field over the last fifty years. It covers a range of topics, including (but…mehr
This book includes up-to-date contributions in the broadly defined area of probabilistic analysis of voting rules and decision mechanisms. Featuring papers from all fields of social choice and game theory, it presents probability arguments to allow readers to gain a better understanding of the properties of decision rules and of the functioning of modern democracies. In particular, it focuses on the legacy of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley, two prominent scholars who have made important contributions to this field over the last fifty years. It covers a range of topics, including (but not limited to) computational and technical aspects of probability approaches, evaluation of the likelihood of voting paradoxes, power indices, empirical evaluations of voting rules, models of voters' behavior, and strategic voting. The book gathers articles written in honor of Gehrlein and Lepelley along with original works written by the two scholars themselves.
Mostapha Diss is a Full Professor of Economics at the University of Franche-Comté and a member of the Centre de recherche sur les stratégies économiques (CRESE). Vincent Merlin is a CNRS Research Professor of Economics at the University of Caen Normandie, France, since 1997. His research topics incude social choice theory, game theory, and the analysis of voting systems.
Inhaltsangabe
1 Introduction Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin .- Part IThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules and Related Paradoxes .- 2 Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley.- 3 Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules under IAC: Indifference and Abstention Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui.- 4 The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi.- 5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Martin Strobel.- Part II Other Voting Paradoxes.- 6 On the Probability of the Ostrogorski's Paradox William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin.- 7 Violations of Reversal Symmetry under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules. Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih.- Part III Binary Voting in Federations.-8 Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean Louis Rouet, and Laurent Vidu.- 9 "One Man, One Vote" Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik versus May Olivier de Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, and Issofa Moyouwou.- Part IV Resistance to Manipulations.- 10 Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules: A Comparison of Standard and Favardin-Lepelley types of Individual Manipulations Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov, and Vyacheslav Yakuba.- 11 Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, and Martin Strobel.- 12 Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: Scoring Rules and Scoring Run-off Systems. Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou.- Part V Game Theory 13 Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted VotingGames: Some Further Results Fabrice Barthelemy and Mathieu Martin.- 14 Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis in Large Elections Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez.- Part VI Techniques for Probability Computations.- 15 Combinatorics of Voting Rules under Anonymity and Neutrality Alexander Karpov.- 16 From Gehrlein-Fishburn Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of the Ehrhart Extended Conjecture Nicolas-Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou.- 17 IAC-Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui.
1 Introduction Mostapha Diss and Vincent Merlin .- Part IThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules and Related Paradoxes .- 2 Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions William V. Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley.- 3 Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules under IAC: Indifference and Abstention Mostapha Diss, Eric Kamwa, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui.- 4 The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner Mostapha Diss, Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi, and Abdelmonaim Tlidi.- 5 Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Martin Strobel.- Part II Other Voting Paradoxes.- 6 On the Probability of the Ostrogorski's Paradox William V. Gehrlein and Vincent Merlin.- 7 Violations of Reversal Symmetry under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules. Raouia Belayadi and Boniface Mbih.- Part III Binary Voting in Federations.-8 Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union Marc Feix, Dominique Lepelley, Vincent Merlin, Jean Louis Rouet, and Laurent Vidu.- 9 "One Man, One Vote" Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik versus May Olivier de Mouzon, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, and Issofa Moyouwou.- Part IV Resistance to Manipulations.- 10 Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules: A Comparison of Standard and Favardin-Lepelley types of Individual Manipulations Fuad Aleskerov, Daniel Karabekyan, Alexander Ivanov, and Vyacheslav Yakuba.- 11 Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, and Martin Strobel.- 12 Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: Scoring Rules and Scoring Run-off Systems. Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou.- Part V Game Theory 13 Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted VotingGames: Some Further Results Fabrice Barthelemy and Mathieu Martin.- 14 Who Wins and Loses under Approval Voting? An Analysis in Large Elections Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez.- Part VI Techniques for Probability Computations.- 15 Combinatorics of Voting Rules under Anonymity and Neutrality Alexander Karpov.- 16 From Gehrlein-Fishburn Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of the Ehrhart Extended Conjecture Nicolas-Gabriel Andjiga, Boniface Mbih, and Issofa Moyouwou.- 17 IAC-Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report Abdelhalim El Ouafdi, Issofa Moyouwou, and Hatem Smaoui.
Rezensionen
"The volume gives a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in probability modeling of voting rules. ... All chapters in the volume present new results or refer to ones achieved recently." (Hannu Nurmi, Journal of Economics, Vol. 134, 2021)
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