Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things of any kind. But do we ever succeed in theorizing about absolutely everything? Not according to generality relativism, which J.P. Studd defends in this book.
Almost no systematic theorizing is generality-free. Scientists test general hypotheses; set theorists prove theorems about every set; metaphysicians espouse theses about all things of any kind. But do we ever succeed in theorizing about absolutely everything? Not according to generality relativism, which J.P. Studd defends in this book.
J. P. Studd is an Associate Professor at the University of Oxford, and a Fellow of Lady Margaret Hall. He works primarily in logic, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mathematics.
Inhaltsangabe
1: Absolutism and Relativism 2: Russell, Zermelo, and Dummett 3: Quantiers 4: Restrictionism and Expansionism 5: Schemas 6: Modal Operators 7: Russell Reductio Redux 8: How Universes Expand Appendix A: Logic Appendix B: Modalization Appendix C: Set Theory