Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, the twin pillars of…mehr
Few concepts have been considered as essential to the theory of knowledge and rational belief as that of evidence. The simplest theory which accounts for this is evidentialism, the view that epistemic justification for belief--the kind of justification typically taken to be required for knowledge--is determined solely by considerations pertaining to one's evidence. In this ground-breaking book, leading epistemologists from across the spectrum challenge and refine evidentialism, sometimes suggesting that it needs to be expanded in quite surprising directions. Following this, the twin pillars of contemporary evidentialism--Earl Conee and Richard Feldman--respond to each essay. This engaging debate covers a vast number of issues, and will illuminate and inform.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Trent Dougherty graduated from the University of Rochester, where he wrote a dissertation arguing against the notion that whether one knows depends on one's practical interests. He is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University, where he regularly teaches graduate seminars in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of religion. When not writing philosophy, he is usually riding a bike, often with his wife or one of his children.
Inhaltsangabe
* Introduction * Part I. Evidentialism and Disagreement * 1: Michael Huemer: Evidence and Agent-Centered Norms * 2: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent * 3: Keith Lehrer: Evidentialism and the Paradox of Parity * Part II. Virtue Critiques: Evidence and Inquiry * 4: Guy Axtell: From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism * 5: Jason Baehr: Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue * Part III. Evidentialism and Skepticism * 6: Matthias Steup: Evidentialist Anti-skepticism * 7: Michael Bergmann: Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection * Part IV. "Knowledge First" * 8: Keith DeRose: Questioning Evidentialism * 9: Timothy Williamson: Improbable Knowing * Part V. Internalism/Externalism * 10: John Greco: Evidentialism and Knowledge * 11: Richard Fumerton: Evidentialism and Truth * Part VI. Evidence * 12: Richard Swinburne: Evidence * 13: Patrick Rysiew: Making it Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification and Belief * 14: Trent Dougherty: In Defense of Propositionalism about Evidence * Part VII. New Syntheses * 15: Duncan Pritchard: Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism * 16: Alvin Goldman: Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? * Part VIII. Replies * 17. Replies * Appendix A: Chart Summary of Arguments * Appendix B: Bibliography of Conee and Feldman * Index
* Introduction * Part I. Evidentialism and Disagreement * 1: Michael Huemer: Evidence and Agent-Centered Norms * 2: Jonathan Kvanvig: The Rational Significance of Reflective Ascent * 3: Keith Lehrer: Evidentialism and the Paradox of Parity * Part II. Virtue Critiques: Evidence and Inquiry * 4: Guy Axtell: From Internalist Evidentialism to Virtue Responsibilism * 5: Jason Baehr: Evidentialism, Vice, and Virtue * Part III. Evidentialism and Skepticism * 6: Matthias Steup: Evidentialist Anti-skepticism * 7: Michael Bergmann: Evidentialism and the Great Pumpkin Objection * Part IV. "Knowledge First" * 8: Keith DeRose: Questioning Evidentialism * 9: Timothy Williamson: Improbable Knowing * Part V. Internalism/Externalism * 10: John Greco: Evidentialism and Knowledge * 11: Richard Fumerton: Evidentialism and Truth * Part VI. Evidence * 12: Richard Swinburne: Evidence * 13: Patrick Rysiew: Making it Evident: Evidence and Evidentness, Justification and Belief * 14: Trent Dougherty: In Defense of Propositionalism about Evidence * Part VII. New Syntheses * 15: Duncan Pritchard: Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism * 16: Alvin Goldman: Toward a Synthesis of Reliabilism and Evidentialism? * Part VIII. Replies * 17. Replies * Appendix A: Chart Summary of Arguments * Appendix B: Bibliography of Conee and Feldman * Index
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