First published twenty years ago, Lawrence Freedman's Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, taking the story to contemporary arguments about missile defence.
First published twenty years ago, Lawrence Freedman's Evolution of Nuclear Strategy was immediately acclaimed as the standard work on the history of attempts to cope militarily and politically with the terrible destructive power of nuclear weapons. It has now been rewritten, drawing on a wide range of new research, and updated to take account of the period following the end of the cold war, taking the story to contemporary arguments about missile defence.
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN is Professor of War Studies and Head of the School of Social Science and Public Policy at King's College, London. He is the author of many books and articles, including The Gulf Conflict (with Efraim Karsh) and Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam. In 1997 he was appointed Official Historian of the Falklands Campaign.
Inhaltsangabe
Preface to the Third Edition Acknowledgements Introduction PART I: FIRST AND SECOND THOUGHTS The Arrival of the Bomb Offence and Defence Aggression and Retaliation PART II: TOWARDS A POLICY OF DETERRENCE Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate Massive Retaliation PART III: LIMITED WAR Limited Objectives Limited Means PART IV: THE FEAR OF SUPRISE ATTACK The Importance of Being First Sputniks and the Soviet Threat The Technological Arms Race PART V: THE STRATEGY OF STABLE CONFLICT The Formal Strategists Arms Control Bargaining and Escalation PART VI: FROM COUNTER-FORCE TO ASSURED DESTRUCTION City-Avoidance Assured Destruction The Soviet Approach to Deterrence The Chinese Connection PART VII: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION A Conventional Defence for Europe The European Nuclear Option (i) Anglo-Saxon Views The European Nuclear Option (ii) French and German Views PART VIII: RETREAT FROM ASSURED DESTRUCTION Military-Industrial Complexities The Consensus Undermined Parity Selective Options The Reagan Administration and the Great Nuclear Debate PART IX: AFTER THE COLD WAR The Threat Evaporates Rogues and Rebels The Threat Evaporates The Second Nuclear Age Can There be a Nuclear Strategy? Notes Bibliography Subject Index Name Index
Preface to the Third Edition Acknowledgements Introduction PART I: FIRST AND SECOND THOUGHTS The Arrival of the Bomb Offence and Defence Aggression and Retaliation PART II: TOWARDS A POLICY OF DETERRENCE Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly Strategy for an Atomic Stalemate Massive Retaliation PART III: LIMITED WAR Limited Objectives Limited Means PART IV: THE FEAR OF SUPRISE ATTACK The Importance of Being First Sputniks and the Soviet Threat The Technological Arms Race PART V: THE STRATEGY OF STABLE CONFLICT The Formal Strategists Arms Control Bargaining and Escalation PART VI: FROM COUNTER-FORCE TO ASSURED DESTRUCTION City-Avoidance Assured Destruction The Soviet Approach to Deterrence The Chinese Connection PART VII: THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION A Conventional Defence for Europe The European Nuclear Option (i) Anglo-Saxon Views The European Nuclear Option (ii) French and German Views PART VIII: RETREAT FROM ASSURED DESTRUCTION Military-Industrial Complexities The Consensus Undermined Parity Selective Options The Reagan Administration and the Great Nuclear Debate PART IX: AFTER THE COLD WAR The Threat Evaporates Rogues and Rebels The Threat Evaporates The Second Nuclear Age Can There be a Nuclear Strategy? Notes Bibliography Subject Index Name Index
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