It has been realised for some time how game theory can model natural selection. Evolutionary game theory replaces the concept of rational players with the population dynamics of behavioural programmes and can be used to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution.
It has been realised for some time how game theory can model natural selection. Evolutionary game theory replaces the concept of rational players with the population dynamics of behavioural programmes and can be used to understand the strategic and genetic foundations of the endless chronicle of invasions and extinctions which punctuate evolution.Hinweis: Dieser Artikel kann nur an eine deutsche Lieferadresse ausgeliefert werden.
Introduction for game theorists Introduction for biologists Part I. Dynamical Systems And Lotka-Volterra Equations: 1. The logistic equation 2. Lotka-Volterra for predator-prey systems 3. Lotka-Volterra for two competitors 4. Ecological equations for two species 5. Lotka-Volterra for more than two populations Part II. Game Dynamics And Replicator Equations: 6. Evolutionarily stable strategies 7. Replicator equations 8. Other game dynamics 9. Adaptive dynamics 10. Asymmetric conflicts 11. More on bimatrix games Part III. More On Lotka-Volterra And Replicator Dynamics: 12. Hypercircles and permanence 13. Criteria for permanence 14. Replicator networks 15. Stability in n-species communities 16. Some low-dimensional ecological systems 17. Heteroclinic cycles and C-matrices Part IV. Population Genetics: 18. Discrete dynamical systems in population genetics 19. Continuous selection dynamics 20. Mutation and recombination 21. Fertility selection 22. Game dynamics for Mendelian populations Bibliography Index.
Introduction for game theorists Introduction for biologists Part I. Dynamical Systems And Lotka-Volterra Equations: 1. The logistic equation 2. Lotka-Volterra for predator-prey systems 3. Lotka-Volterra for two competitors 4. Ecological equations for two species 5. Lotka-Volterra for more than two populations Part II. Game Dynamics And Replicator Equations: 6. Evolutionarily stable strategies 7. Replicator equations 8. Other game dynamics 9. Adaptive dynamics 10. Asymmetric conflicts 11. More on bimatrix games Part III. More On Lotka-Volterra And Replicator Dynamics: 12. Hypercircles and permanence 13. Criteria for permanence 14. Replicator networks 15. Stability in n-species communities 16. Some low-dimensional ecological systems 17. Heteroclinic cycles and C-matrices Part IV. Population Genetics: 18. Discrete dynamical systems in population genetics 19. Continuous selection dynamics 20. Mutation and recombination 21. Fertility selection 22. Game dynamics for Mendelian populations Bibliography Index.
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