Executive compensations package and stock splits - Broens, Robbert
32,99 €
inkl. MwSt.
Versandkostenfrei*
Versandfertig in über 4 Wochen
  • Broschiertes Buch

Are managers more inclined to split their shares if they stand to personally benefit from them? The greater the variable compensation in the remuneration package, i.e., the more a compensation package represents a call option on the stock; the more inclined CEOs are to split the firms' shares. Accompanied by the increase in stock price and volatility subsequent to a stock split, CEOs can increase the value of their option packages by splitting the firm's shares as it sends a credible signal to the market. By focusing on stock option exercise behaviour of CEOs I provide initial evidence that executives use the stock split to time option exercises.…mehr

Andere Kunden interessierten sich auch für
Produktbeschreibung
Are managers more inclined to split their shares if they stand to personally benefit from them? The greater the variable compensation in the remuneration package, i.e., the more a compensation package represents a call option on the stock; the more inclined CEOs are to split the firms' shares. Accompanied by the increase in stock price and volatility subsequent to a stock split, CEOs can increase the value of their option packages by splitting the firm's shares as it sends a credible signal to the market. By focusing on stock option exercise behaviour of CEOs I provide initial evidence that executives use the stock split to time option exercises.
Autorenporträt
Der Autor verfügt über einen BSC-Abschluss in internationaler Wirtschaft mit Schwerpunkt Finanzen, den er an der Universität Maastricht und der Hong Kong University of Science and Technology erworben hat. Danach erwarb er seinen MSC-Abschluss in Finanzen an der Universität Maastricht.